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              ABSTRACT 
 
 
Internal and External Attention in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 by 
Tehila Eilam-Stock, M.A., M.Phil. 
 
 
Advisor: Jin Fan, PhD 
 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive neurodevelopmental condition affecting 
individuals throughout the lifespan. Sensory hypersensitivity and superior perceptual acuity are 
well documented in individuals with ASD, and may indicate heightened orientation of attention 
to external stimuli, as attention can augment sensory perception. Recent evidence from mind-
wandering research suggests that the ability to disengage attention from the external 
environment and direct it internally to self-generated mentation is crucial for adaptive cognition 
and behavior, as it allows for incorporation of past knowledge and experience in the 
interpretation of novel situations. We hypothesized that ASD is related to an imbalance between 
externally and internally directed attention, where excessive allocation of attention to external 
(sensory) information (i.e., external attention) limits spontaneous attention to self-generated 
mentation (i.e., internal attention). This attention bias restricts accessibility of internal 
information (e.g., memories, thoughts, knowledge) and consequently, the ability to form 
adaptive predictions and interpretations of the world. To test this hypothesis, three studies were 
conducted, examining both spontaneous and voluntary allocation of attention to internal and 
external stimuli, with and without competing external and internal information. Sixteen high-
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functioning adults with ASD and 15 typically-developing control (TDC) participants were 
recruited for the studies. Results demonstrated that participants with ASD had an overall 
reduced cognitive efficiency compared to TDC. Importantly, performance in the ASD group 
was less influenced by presentation of conflict and incongruency. However, no statistical 
evidence was found for group differences in internal or external attention across tasks. Thus, the 
findings suggest reduced utilization of contextual information and previous experience (i.e., 
internal information) in interpretation of external stimuli, but do not support the hypothesis that 
this deficit is related to external over internal attention bias. Multiple factors, such as within-
group variability, small sample-size, and limited ecological validity of the tasks may account for 
these results. Our findings are discussed in relation to a range of potential explanations, as well 
as to other cognitive models of ASD.  
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Chapter I 
Research Objectives 
Attention is fundamental to conscious experience, as it allows for the selection, 
prioritization and facilitation of processing of a limited number of items at any given moment 
(Posner & Fan, 2008). Attention can be directed externally to information originating outside of 
the brain, conveyed to the brain by sensory afferents (i.e., external attention). Attention can also 
be directed internally to information originating within the brain, such as thoughts, mental 
imagery, and memories (i.e., internal attention). Recent evidence from mind-wandering research 
suggests that humans constantly shift their attention between external (i.e. sensory) and internal 
(i.e. self-generated) sources of information (Lenartowicz, Simpson, & Cohen, 2013; Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2006). These shifts can occur spontaneously or voluntarily, with or without 
awareness (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), and may have critical implications for adaptive 
cognition and behavior by facilitating problem-solving (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 
2013), conflict resolution (Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011), active interpretation of 
the world (Bar, 2009; Pellicano & Burr, 2012), and preparation for future events (Baird, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). It has been proposed that the ability to attend to internal 
information is especially important for social behavior (Brock, 2012; Dixon, Fox, & Christoff, 
2014), as social interactions are particularly complex, requiring rapid interpretations, predictions, 
and conflict resolution which would depend on prior experience and representations in memory 
(Baird et al., 2011; Bar, 2009). 
Impaired social behavior is a hallmark of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), a pervasive 
neurodevelopmental condition, characterized by abnormal social interactions and 
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communication, repetitive behaviors, restricted interest and atypical sensory processing ( 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Despite extensive research into the cognitive and 
neural underpinnings of ASD, its etiology is not well-understood. Findings of sensory 
hypersensitivity (Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009; Bonnel et al., 
2003; Cascio et al., 2008) and superior perceptual acuity (Heaton, Davis, & Happe, 2008; Ropar 
& Mitchell, 2002) in individuals with ASD are well-documented and may suggest heightened 
external attention. Empirical investigation of internal attention in ASD, however, is scarce. 
Findings from our recent study (Eilam-Stock et al., 2014) may support reduced internal attention 
in ASD. In this study, we examined autonomic and associated brain activities during rest in high-
functioning adults with ASD and matched typically developing controls (TDC). We found that 
participants in the ASD group had significantly less non-specific (i.e., non-task related) skin 
conductance responses (SCR; a sensitive index of sympathetic activity) compared to the TDC 
group. Importantly, we also found that this activity was mainly correlated with sensory cortices 
in the ASD group, while it was correlated with areas implicated in internal mentation and self-
referential processing (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) in the control group. Non-specific SCR was 
previously linked to spontaneous, self-generated thoughts (Nikula, 1991). Taken together, one 
compelling interpretation of these results is that while TDC participants were engaged in 
reflection and self-referential mentation during rest, individuals with ASD directed their attention 
externally, even in the absence of any external task. 
Hypothesis and Aims 
The general hypothesis tested is that ASD is related to attention bias, where attention 
resources (which are limited) are excessively allocated to sensory information, at the expense of 
attention to internal mentation. According to this model, individuals with ASD are subjects to a 
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vicious cycle, where heightened external attention limits accessibility of internal information 
(e.g., thoughts, memories, knowledge). This diminishes the individual’s ability to adaptively 
interpret the situation or environment, resulting in greater ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Subsequently, the environment is experienced as unpredictable and threatening, leading to 
enhanced external attention in order to get more information about the external environment and 
reduce ambiguity.  
Though likely not the sole explanation, this attention bias model may be related to each 
of the ASD characteristics. As attention is closely related to perception (by enhancing or 
suppressing sensory signals), excessive external attention with limited internal constraints can 
explain the atypical sensory processing in ASD. The resulting ambiguity and unpredictability of 
the external environment can explain the desire for sameness that characterizes individuals with 
ASD and is linked to repetitive behavior and restricted interest; by restricting the variability in 
the environment, ambiguity and uncertainty are also decreased. Finally, as social interactions are 
particularly complex and require rapid predictions and interpretations based on prior knowledge 
and experience, the attention-bias hypothesis would explain abnormal social behavior, which is a 
hallmark of ASD. 
To test the hypothesis of attention-bias in ASD, a series of studies were designed and 
implemented, following three specific aims: 
1. Investigation of spontaneous orientation of attention internally and externally during 
rest in individuals with ASD and TDC.  
2. Investigation of internal and external attention under minimal cognitive demands in 
individuals with ASD and TDC.  
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3. Investigation of internal and external attention under internal and external demands in 
individuals with ASD and TDC. 
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Chapter II 
General Introduction 
 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive neurodevelopmental condition, 
characterized by impaired social interactions, repetitive behaviors, restricted interest and sensory 
abnormalities. Individuals with ASD can range significantly in intellectual and functional 
abilities and symptom severity. However, ASD is often accompanied by significant impairment 
in daily functioning, regardless of intelligence quotient (IQ) levels (Charman et al., 2011), with 
high rates of unemployment and low levels of independence in adolescence and adulthood 
(Howlin, Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2004). Its prevalence is estimated at 0.5-2% in the general 
population (Ramsey, Kelly-Vance, Allen, Rosol, & Yoerger, 2016; Soke, Maenner, Christensen, 
Kurzius-Spencer, & Schieve, 2017) with higher occurrences in males, as compared to females. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in its 5th edition (DSM-
5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), individuals diagnosed with ASD should meet 
several criteria. First, they should demonstrate deficits in social interaction and communication, 
which may include abnormal socio-emotional reciprocity, impaired nonverbal communication, 
and difficulty developing and maintaining social relationships. In addition, individuals diagnosed 
with ASD should exhibit restricted interest and repetitive behaviors, which may include 
repetitive speech, movements or use of objects, excessive adherence to rituals and routines, 
resistance to change, and abnormally restricted interests. New to the 5th edition of the DSM is 
another criterion under this category, in which hyper-or-hypo-reactivity to sensory stimuli may 
be present. This addition to the diagnostic criteria reflects converging evidence from multiple 
studies and case-reports, featuring abnormal sensitivity to sensory inputs as a core element in the 
clinical manifestation of ASD (Baum, Stevenson, & Wallace, 2015; Marco, Hinkley, Hill, & 
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Nagarajan, 2011; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006; Robertson & Baron-
Cohen, 2017; Thye, Bednarz, Herringshaw, Sartin, & Kana, 2017). 
 Despite extensive empirical investigation into the etiology of ASD, the neurological and 
cognitive substrates of the disorder are not well-understood, though considerable advances have 
been made. Early psychological and cognitive models, such as the Theory of Mind (Baron-
Cohen, 1989, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 2000; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1994) and 
Interpersonal Relatedness (Hobson, 1990; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988) accounts of ASD, 
focused on the socioemotional processing in this disorder, aiming at providing explanations to 
the striking, abnormal social behaviors, which are a hallmark of ASD. More recent cognitive 
models of ASD, such as the Weak Central Coherence (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 
2006), Complex Information Processing (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997; Williams, 
Goldstein, & Minshew, 2006), Intense World (Markram, Rinaldi, & Markram, 2007; Markram & 
Markram, 2010), and Predictive Coding (Gomot & Wicker, 2012; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 
2014; Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Sinha et al., 2014; Van Boxtel & Lu, 2013) 
accounts of ASD, provide more comprehensive explanations, attempting at explaining the 
different clinical presentations and symptoms of the disorder, both social and non-social, under 
one unifying framework. Yet, another approach, the biological accounts of ASD (Courchesne, 
Campbell, & Solso, 2011; Courchesne et al., 2007; Ecker, Bookheimer, & Murphy, 2015; Ecker, 
Spooren, & Murphy, 2013), aims at identifying the genetic, physiological, neuromorphological 
and subcellular substrates of ASD. 
 One challenging aspect in ASD research is the great variability within this population, 
including differences in clinical presentations, IQ, gender-related variability, genetic mutations, 
and neuromorphology, which often results in conflicting findings or insignificant results (Eilam-
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Stock, Wu, Spagna, Egan, & Fan, 2016). Small sample sizes further exacerbate this issue, 
hindering the ability of inferential statistical techniques to identify existing differences between 
ASD individuals and the general population. In addition, a complex neurodevelopmental 
trajectory, characterized by an early brain overgrowth (Courchesne, Carper, & Akshoomoff, 
2003; Zielinski et al., 2014; Zwaigenbaum et al., 2014), followed by arrested growth later in 
childhood and early adolescence (Courchesne et al., 2001; Mak-Fan, Taylor, Roberts, & Lerch, 
2012), and accelerated neural atrophy later in adulthood (Courchesne et al., 2011; Lange et al., 
2015), coupled with reports of spontaneous improvement in ASD symptomatology across the life 
span (Beker, Foxe, & Molholm, 2017), suggest that age differences may also contribute to 
inconsistency in findings.  
External and Internal Attention 
 “Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of 
thought…” 
“Whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us, 
another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our own head.” 
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890 
Attention is a complex construct. Although “everyone knows what attention is,” as James 
had famously declared, its actual definition remains the subject of an on-going scientific debate 
for over a century. Numerous models of attention were developed over the years, and rigorous 
empirical investigation was conducted to identify attentional mechanisms, as well as neural 
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networks supporting attention. Several principles have emerged with a reasonable degree of 
consensus. First, attention allows for the selection, prioritization and facilitation of processing of 
a limited number of items at any given moment (Fan & Posner, 2004; Fan et al., 2005; Chun et 
al., 2011). Our natural environment is overloaded with an endless number of different stimuli, of 
which, only a few can be processed at once. This limited processing capacity of the brain dictates 
the need for a mechanism that will enable the selection and prioritization of the most salient 
information for further processing, while ignoring (or suppressing) other, less-relevant, stimuli. 
Furthermore, attention mechanisms enhance the magnitude of selected signals, thereby, facilitate 
their processing, while attenuating the magnitude of ignored signals (Posner & Petersen, 1990; 
Posner & Dehane, 1994; Posner & Fan, 2008). Attention, therefore, is closely related to 
perception, and can greatly affect the way we view the world. Another agreed upon principle of 
attention (although see (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012)) is that attention can be a 
voluntary (goal-directed) process, where top-down mechanisms select the materials to be 
processed, or an involuntary (stimulus-driven) process, where salient stimuli automatically 
capture bottom-up mechanisms of attention (Buschman & Miller, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). Finally, attention can be directed externally, to sensory information, or internally, to 
information originating within the brain (Marvin M Chun & Johnson, 2011; Kiyonaga & Egner, 
2013; Lenartowicz et al., 2013). The precise definition of what constitutes external versus 
internal attention, however, is not unequivocal.  
In a recent attempt to define internal and external attention, Chun, Golomb, and Turk-
Browne (2011) argued that internal attention (or ‘reflective attention’) is a mechanism by which 
internally-generated information is being selected and modulated. This is in contrast to external 
attention (or ‘perceptual attention’), which is a mechanism of selection and modulation of 
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sensory information. According to their model, these are two separate mechanisms, where 
external attention includes both top-down (goal-directed) and bottom-up (stimulus driven) 
capacities, and is modality specific. Internal attention, on the other hand, is exclusively top-
down, and includes different cognitive functions, such as working and long-term memory, task 
set, response selection, and cognitive control (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011).   
The literature on internally-directed processes includes different terminologies, such as 
internally directed cognition (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Dixon, Fox, & 
Christoff, 2014; Leech & Sharp, 2014), spontaneous internal exploration (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2010), self-generated thought (O'Callaghan, Shine, Lewis, Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2015; 
Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013), internal train of thought (Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & 
Schooler, 2012), internally-directed activities (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008), stimulus-
independent thought (Mason et al., 2007; Schooler et al., 2011), task-unrelated thought 
(McKiernan, D'Angelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006), and internally generated cognitive activities 
(McKiernan et al., 2006). The term ‘attention lapses’ is also used in the literature (Awh & Vogel, 
2015; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006), referring to periods during which 
attention is disengaged from the external environment, and is spontaneously shifted to internal 
mentation that is not task-related. In the context of mind-wandering research, internal attention 
has been defined as drifts of attention from an external task to a “mental content generated by the 
individual, rather than cued by the environment” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Dixon et al. 
(2014) defined this construct as attention to information that is “inside the head or body.” 
In the current work, external attention is defined as attention directed to sensory stimuli 
that are conveyed to the brain by sensory afferents. Importantly, these sensory stimuli may 
originate in the external environment (i.e., exteroceptive), or within the body (i.e., interoceptive). 
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Internal attention, on the other hand, is defined here as attention directed to stimuli originating 
within the brain, such as thoughts, memories, concerns, imagery and knowledge. This definition 
stands in contrast to other theoretical frameworks that have considered attention to bodily 
sensations as internal attention (e.g., Dixon et al., 2014). Also, note that in this view, external and 
internal attention are sharing the same mechanisms. The only difference is merely the source of 
information to which attention is directed, not the mechanism itself. Therefore, we can voluntary 
direct our attention to sensory stimuli from the external environment (e.g., a conversation with a 
friend) or from our own body (e.g., focusing on our breath during meditation), as well as to 
internal stimuli (e.g., actively recalling information during an exam). At the same time, salient 
information captures our attention involuntarily, whether it is exteroceptive (e.g., red traffic 
light), interoceptive (e.g., pain), or internal (e.g., mind wandering). Additionally, our attention is 
directed to multiple stimuli from all three sources at any given moment, but at different levels; 
due to its limited capacity, the more attentional resources are directed to a particular stimulus 
(either external or internal), the less attentional resources are available for other stimuli (both 
external and internal).  
The Interplay between Internal and External Attention in Adaptive Cognition and 
Behavior 
 Whilst most of the attention literature has been focused on understanding the mechanisms 
underlying external attention, more recently, there has been an increasing interest in exploring 
the mechanisms that allow us to attend internally, as well as their psychological utility. Given the 
ubiquitous nature of internal attention in our daily lives (e.g., through mind-wandering, mental 
time-travel, imagery and creativity), and its universality, an adaptive role has been reasonably 
assumed. Indeed, a large-scale experience-sampling study with approximately 5000 participants 
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from 83 different countries revealed that individuals across the world tend to spend almost 50% 
of their day in internal mentation (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Moreover, a constant 
interplay between internal and external attention seems to underly different aspects of adaptive 
cognition and behavior (Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007; Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2005), 
suggesting that imbalance between these functions may be maladaptive. Recent evidence from 
mind-wandering research demonstrates that humans constantly shift their attention between 
external and internal sources of information (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; 
Dixon et al., 2014; Lenartowicz et al., 2013; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 
2015). These shifts can occur spontaneously or voluntarily, with or without awareness 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). They allow us to access semantic (i.e., knowledge) and episodic 
(i.e., past experience) memories and utilize this information when interpreting a current situation 
and forming predictions about what will follow (Bar et al., 2007). The ability to draw on our 
experience and knowledge reduces ambiguity and uncertainty in novel situations, as it makes the 
environment more familiar and predictable. This is particularly useful in navigating the social 
world, where one is constantly required to rapidly form hypotheses and predictions about new 
people or novel situations. In addition, the interplay between internal and external attention 
facilitates insightfulness and creativity (Baird et al., 2012), problem-solving (Ruby et al., 2013), 
conflict resolution (Gerlach et al., 2011), and preparation for future events (Baird et al., 2011; 
Bar, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011). Taken together, a balanced, flexible alternation between 
internal and external orientation of attention appears to be critical for adaptive behavior, 
especially in a social context (Bar, 2009; Brock, 2012), as social interactions are particularly 
complex, requiring rapid interpretations, predictions, and conflict resolution which would depend 
on prior experience and representations in memory (Baird et al., 2011; Bar, 2009; Gerlach et al., 
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2011).   
External and Internal Attention in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 External Attention in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Sensory abnormality is one of the 
most commonly reported features of ASD and is now included in the diagnostic criteria of the 
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The prevalence of sensory symptoms in ASD 
is estimated at 90-95%, affecting children and adults alike, regardless of IQ levels (Laura Crane, 
Goddard, & Pring, 2009; Leekam, Nieto, Libby, Wing, & Gould, 2007). They can manifest as 
hypersensitivity or hyposensitivity to sensory stimuli, which may result in sensory overload or 
sensory seeking behaviors, respectively (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Liss, Saulnier, Fein, & 
Kinsbourne, 2006; Pellicano, 2013). The sensory abnormalities in ASD are found across 
modalities (Kirby, Boyd, Williams, Faldowski, & Baranek, 2017), and may vary greatly between 
individuals with ASD (Crane et al., 2009), as well as fluctuate significantly within the same 
individual (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Pellicano, 2013; Rogers & Ozonoff, 2005). It was further 
found that sensory symptoms can distinguish children with ASD from children with other 
developmental delays (Baranek, 1999; Wiggins, Robins, Bakeman, & Adamson, 2009), and are 
present already in the first year of life (Baranek, 1999; Estes et al., 2015). The etiology of the 
sensory symptoms in ASD is not well-understood; they may stem from alterations in the sensory 
organs, in neural pathways conveying sensory information to the brain, or in the central 
processing of sensory signals – in lower-level sensory cortices and/or higher-level cortical 
regions enrolled in sensory integration and perception. Attention also plays a critical role in 
sensation and sensory perception by enhancing sensory signals and perceptual acuity of attended 
stimuli, as well as attenuation of sensation and perception of unattended stimuli (Posner & 
Petersen, 1990; Posner & Dehane, 1994; Posner & Fan, 2008). Research to date did not reveal 
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any significant alterations in the sensory organs themselves in individuals with ASD, and 
measures of basic perceptual abilities, such as visual acuity, did not differ in ASD (Sven Bölte et 
al., 2012; Robertson & Baron-Cohen, 2017); therefore, sensory abnormalities in ASD are likely 
related to atypical central processing of sensory signals, which may include increased attention to 
sensory stimuli, i.e., external attention.  
 An accumulating body of research has revealed atypical, and even superior, perceptual 
processing in individuals with ASD within and across different sensory modalities. Findings of 
sensory sensitivity and superior perceptual abilities in individuals with ASD are well-
documented (Baum et al., 2015; Marco et al., 2011; L. Mottron et al., 2006; Robertson & Baron-
Cohen, 2017; Thye et al., 2017). Studies of children and adults with ASD have demonstrated 
superior performance of ASD individuals on visual search (Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 
1998b) and visual discrimination (Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998a) tasks and on the 
Embedded Figures (Shah & Frith, 1983), Block Design (Bölte, Hubl, Dierks, Holtmann, & 
Poustka, 2008; Amitta Shah & Frith, 1993) and Hidden Pictures tests (Jobs, Falck-Ytter, & 
Bölte, 2018). They also exhibit a more accurate visual (Ropar & Mitchell, 2002) and auditory 
(Heaton et al., 2008) perception, as well as enhanced visual (Mottron et al., 2006), auditory 
(Bonnel et al., 2003; Remington & Fairnie, 2017) and tactile (Cascio et al., 2008) perception. As 
attention plays a major role in perception by prioritizing and facilitating processing of sensory 
stimuli, the perceptual profile that emerges from these findings, together with clinical reports of 
sensory sensitivity in ASD, suggest excessive allocation of attentional resources to sensory 
stimuli in this condition.  
Internal Attention in Autism Spectrum Disorder. One of the earliest demonstrations of 
altered internal attention in ASD is a descriptive study of self-reported inner experiences in three 
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high functioning, verbally-fluent adults diagnosed with Asperger syndrome (Hurlburt, Happe, & 
Frith, 1994). The three participants sampled their inner experiences at random times (prompted 
by a beeping device) within a period of several hours, followed by an interview session, 
discussing these inner experiences with the researchers. The researchers found that the inner 
experience reports of these individuals were limited, compared with reports of typically-
developing participants, and were predominately represented as visual images (Hurlburt et al., 
1994). More specifically, while the reportable inner experiences of two participants were mainly 
visual in nature, the third participant had significant difficulties to report any inner experience. 
While it is possible that these findings are related to deficit in the ability to report inner 
experiences, rather than the experiences themselves, this study raised the intriguing possibility 
that inner experiences and/or attention to inner experiences are altered in individuals with ASD.   
Another interesting finding of particular relevance to our hypothesis, is that individuals 
with ASD tend to be less prone to visual illusions, seeing illusory figures more accurately, 
without the ‘corrections’ implemented by the typical brain (Bölte, Holtmann, Poustka, 
Scheurich, & Schmidt, 2007; Happe, 1996). Similarly, it was found that ASD participants were 
less influenced by prior knowledge (e.g., perspective cues) during a visual perception task 
(Ropar & Mitchell, 2002), and their performance on an object recognition task did not improve 
with the presence of cast shadow cues (Becchio, Mari, & Castiello, 2010). Participants with ASD 
were also better at copying impossible figures relative to controls (Mottron, Belleville, & 
Ménard, 1999), suggesting decreased influence by prior knowledge. Collectively, these findings 
imply an under-utilization of prior experience and knowledge in sensory perception. Thus, these 
findings may suggest a limited internal attention in this condition; while typically developing 
individuals incorporate their own knowledge of the world in interpreting novel stimuli, limited 
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internal attention in individuals with ASD may reduce internal constraints on their perception 
and interpretations of the world. This decreased utilization of internal sources of information 
may be beneficial when judging visual illusions, but it can lead to misjudgments of more natural 
situations in which application of previous knowledge is essential for adaptive perception and 
behavior.  
Findings of limited self-referential processing (Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010; Uddin, 2011) and autobiographical memory 
(Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2010) in ASD may 
also relate to reduced internal attention in this disorder. Grey matter abnormalities in the medial 
prefrontal cortex, left inferior frontal gyrus, and the posterior hippocampus found in ASD 
(Eilam-Stock et al., 2016) may provide neuroanatomical substrates to these behavioral 
manifestations. Self-referential processing typically activates a set of regions along the medial 
axis of the brain, commonly termed cortical midline structures (Northoff et al., 2006). These 
regions include the medial prefrontal cortex/pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex/middle cingulate cortex, and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (Kelley et 
al., 2002; Lombardo et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2006). The left inferior frontal gyrus was also 
found to be activated during self-related judgments (Kelley et al., 2002). In addition, the 
posterior hippocampus is involved in the storage and retrieval of autobiographical memories 
(Fernandez et al., 1998; Kim, 2015). Therefore, findings of increased grey matter volume in the 
medial prefrontal cortex and the left inferior frontal gyrus and decreased grey matter volume in 
the posterior hippocampus (Eilam-Stock et al., 2016), may be related to aberrant self-referential 
processing and autobiographical memory in individuals with ASD.  
From a functional perspective, the aforementioned cortical midline structures, together 
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with the temporoparietal junction and medial temporal lobes, are collectively forming the default 
mode network (DMN), which consistently show decreased activation during a wide range of 
tasks, compared to rest/baseline conditions (Biswal, Van Kylen, & Hyde, 1997; Buckner, 
Andrews‐Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Fox et al., 2005; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle & Snyder, 
2007). Interestingly, however, activity within the DMN increases when participants are engaged 
in a variety of internally-directed processes, including both goal-directed internal mentation, 
such as simulated problem-solving (Gerlach et al., 2011), active recall of the past (Sestieri, 
Corbetta, Romani, & Shulman, 2011), planning for the future (Baird et al., 2011; Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), guided mental imagery (Axelrod, Rees, & 
Bar, 2017; Gerlach et al., 2011), and meditation (Brewer et al., 2011; Jang et al., 2011), as well 
as spontaneous, stimulus-driven mentation, such as mind-wandering (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, 
Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Mason et al., 2007; Preminger, Harmelech, & Malach, 2011), passive 
recall (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), and self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006; Qin & 
Northoff, 2011), implicating its general role in internal attention. Notably, decreased activity and 
connectivity within the DMN has been consistently found in ASD samples (Assaf et al., 2010; 
Eilam-Stock et al., 2014; Kennedy & Courchesne, 2008; Monk et al., 2009; Washington et al., 
2014), and may provide a neurofunctional basis for reduced internal attention in this disorder. 
Thus, abnormal DMN activity and connectivity in ASD, coupled with reports of limited 
autobiographical (Tanweer, Rathbone, & Souchay, 2010) and episodic memory (Lind & Bowler, 
2010), episodic future thinking (Lind & Bowler, 2010) and self-referential processing 
(Lombardo et al., 2007; Uddin, 2011) in ASD individuals, may provide additional support for a 
decreased capacity to attend internally in this disorder.  
Finally, support for reduced internal attention in ASD may also come from a recent study 
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conducted by our group (Eilam-Stock et al., 2014), where we looked at non-specific (i.e., non-
task related) autonomic activity and associated brain activity and connectivity during rest in 
high-functioning adults with ASD and matched typically-developing controls (TDC). We found 
that participants in the ASD group had significantly less non-specific skin conductance responses 
(SCR; a sensitive measure of sympathetic activity) compared to the TDC group, albeit typical 
skin conductance level (SCL; averaged electrodermal activity) (Figure 2.1). Importantly, we also 
found that SCR fluctuations were mainly correlated with activity in the sensory cortices in the 
ASD group, while it was correlated with activity in areas implicated in self-referential mentation 
(e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) in the control group (Figure 2.2). In addition, we replicated 
findings of reduced DMN connectivity in the ASD group (Assaf et al., 2010; Weng et al., 2010) 
and found that the strength of the connectivity was modulated by SCR (Figure 2.3). Non-specific 
SCR, as well as DMN activation, have been linked to spontaneous, stimulus-independent, self-
generated thoughts (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Axelrod et al., 2017; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & 
Schacter, 2016; Nikula, 1991). Taken together, one compelling interpretation of these results is 
that while TDC participants were engaged in reflection and self-referential mentation during rest, 
individuals with ASD directed their attention externally, even in the absence of any external task. 
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 Figure 2.1. (a) Skin conductance level (SCL) and (b) number of skin conductance responses (SCR) during the entire rest session (6 minutes). 
 
Figure 2.2. Positive and negative correlations between non-specific skin conductance response (SCR) 
and brain fluctuations during rest in (A) typically-developing controls (TDC), and (B) adults with 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Red indicates voxels with positive correlations, while blue indicates 
voxels with negative correlations. (C) Stronger correlations in TDC compared to ASD (TDC > ASD), 
and (D) Stronger correlations in ASD compared to TDC (ASD > TDC). 
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Existing Cognitive Models of ASD Suggesting Underutilization of Internal Information 
 Several existing cognitive theories of ASD are tapping on the idea that a core deficit in 
the disorder is related to an inefficient use of internal knowledge when making predictions and 
interpretations of the world. Thus, while each of the following models propose a different 
cognitive mechanism to explain the wide range of symptoms in ASD, these postulated 
mechanisms are all depend on selection (i.e., attention) of relevant internal information that is 
then utilized to adaptively guide behavior. In the current work, we propose that the selection 
mechanism of internal knowledge itself (i.e., internal attention) is deficient in ASD.   
Figure 2.3. Functional connectivity of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and an interaction between group 
(TDC vs. ASD) and functional connectivity condition (before vs. after regressing out SCR signal) on PCC 
connectivity. (A) Stronger connectivity in TDC compared to ASD (TDC > ASD). (B) Stronger connectivity in 
ASD, compared to TDC (ASD > TDC). (C) Stronger effects of SCR on PCC connectivity in TDC compared to 
ASD [TDC(with-without SCR) > ASD(with-without SCR)]. (D) Stronger effects of SCR on PCC connectivity 
in ASD compared to TDC [ASD(with-without SCR) > TDC(with-without SCR)]. 
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 Theory of Mind. The term ‘theory of mind’ refers to the ability to ascribe mental states 
to self or others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), and infer (or make predictions), about other 
people’s knowledge, beliefs, intents, and emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985). The ability to infer mental states of others is crucial in explaining and predicting 
other people’s behavior, and thus, fundamental to social behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). This ability is typically well-developed by the age of 
four. In a seminal study, S. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) demonstrated that even high-functioning 
children with ASD fail a false-belief task (Sally and Ann Task), while most normally developing 
children, and children with Down’s Syndrome (with lower IQ levels and mean mental age 
compared to the ASD group) were able to pass the test. The authors, thus, concluded that a 
cognitive deficit in theory of mind, or more specifically, the inability to represent mental states, 
is at the core of ASD, and that this deficit is specific to ASD, regardless of intellectual abilities. 
However, four out of the 20 ASD participants in that study passed the false-belief test. To 
reconcile this finding, Baron-Cohen (1989) conducted a second study in which only high-
functioning ASD participants who passed the original false-belief test were included, along with 
typically developing children and children with Down’s Syndrome. Here, the task involved 
second-order belief attribution (i.e., recursive thinking, e.g., Jane thinks Dave thinks that…). 
None of the ASD participants in this study (n = 10), who successfully passed a first-order false-
belief task, passed the second-order belief attribution test. By contrast, most of the typically-
developing children and 60% of the Down’s Syndrome group had passed the test. These results 
were interpreted by the authors as a further support for a specific deficit in theory of mind in 
ASD that is fundamental to the disorder.   
 While the Theory of Mind account has been wildly accepted in explaining the social 
 
 
21  
symptoms of ASD (e.g., verbal and non-verbal communication, social interaction, play and 
imagination), it did not provide explanation for the non-social symptoms, such as restricted 
interest, ritualistic behavior, resistance to change and sensory abnormalities (Frith & Happe, 
1994; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Moreover, in replications of the original theory of mind studies, it 
was later found that some high functioning individuals with ASD are able to pass both first and 
second order false-belief tasks (Happé, 1994), while other individuals with different 
developmental disorders fail these tasks (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Tager-Flusberg, 
2007). These findings challenge the original argument that a core deficit in theory of mind is 
specific and fundamental to ASD. Nevertheless, this model had raised the intriguing idea that 
ASD is related to a deficit in making predictions and interpretations of social interactions based 
on one’s internal knowledge (i.e., mental representations) and experience. 
 Weak Central Coherence. The Weak Central Coherence account of ASD suggests that 
affected individuals have a more general cognitive deficit in their ability to gain meaning from 
global aspects and interpret the details in the context of the whole (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 
1996). According to this model, individuals with ASD have a fragmented, detail-oriented 
perception of the world, with an information-processing approach that prefers local, rather than 
global features (Happé, 1999; Happe & Frith, 2006; Hill & Frith, 2003). This is not a deficit per 
se, as this unique cognitive style can explain both the assets and the deficits that are frequently 
observed in this disorder in the social and non-social domains (Frith, 1997). For instance, it has 
been consistently shown that high-functioning individuals with ASD demonstrate superior 
performance on tasks that require attention to local information and a piecemeal approach, such 
as the Block Design task (Shah & Frith, 1993), Embedded Figures task (Shah & Frith, 1983), and 
copying impossible figures (Mottron et al., 1999). It was further shown that ASD participants are 
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less susceptible to visual illusions (Happe, 1996), and fail to read homographs in their context 
(Happé, 1997), supporting the notion of a detail-focused information-processing approach in 
ASD that fails to recognize the global meaning or integrate the context (Happé, 1999). 
Importantly, the context can be either external, such as in the Block Design task, or internal, such 
as in the case of visual illusions (i.e. our knowledge about the physics of the world). Recognition 
of a global meaning also oftentimes depends on the utilization of personal experiences and 
knowledge. 
Predictive Coding. The more recent Predictive Coding account of ASD, grounded in 
Bayesian theory, postulates that ASD is related to a more general, higher-order deficit in the 
formulation of inferences about the world based on assessment of sensory information against 
perceptual predictions (Lawson et al., 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). According to Bayesian 
models of perception, the typical brain constantly generates perceptual hypotheses based on 
existing knowledge and past experience (termed ‘priors’) to interpret incoming sensory 
information, which is inherently ambiguous (Bar, 2009; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; 
O’Callaghan, Kveraga, Shine, Adams Jr, & Bar, 2017; Pellicano, 2013). The top-down 
predictions, generated in higher-order brain regions, are compared with bottom-up sensory inputs 
initially processed in the sensory cortices (Friston et al., 2008; Gomot & Wicker, 2012; Lawson 
et al., 2014). In cases of discrepancy (termed ‘prediction error’), the brain resolves the error by 
either updating expectations to improve top-down predictions, or by processes of sensory 
selection (for example, by selective attention to sensory information that will conform with our 
predictions) (Friston et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2014). The confidence in the source of the 
prediction error, termed ‘precision,’ determines the relative influence of prior knowledge and 
beliefs, relative to sensory evidence, on our perception; high sensory precision will lead to 
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increased influence of sensory evidence, while high precision of predictions will increase the 
influence of priors (Friston et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2014). According to Bayesian accounts of 
ASD, abnormality in the predictive coding process, which may be related to attenuation of priors 
(Pellicano & Burr, 2012), heightened sensory precision (Lawson et al., 2014), and/or decreased 
prediction precision (Gomot & Wicker, 2012), results in reduced influence of prior knowledge 
and beliefs on perception. Findings of a more ‘accurate’ perception in ASD, such as decreased 
susceptibility to visual illusions (Happe, 1996), higher prevalence of absolute pitch (Miller, 
1999), and superior performance on visual search tasks (Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, Wolfe, & 
Horowitz, 2009; Plaisted et al., 1998b) and visual discrimination tasks (Plaisted et al., 1998a), 
therefore, may be explained by the decreased internal constraints on perception in this disorder, 
as proposed by this model (Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Findings of decreased 
sensory-adaptation (Tannan, Holden, Zhang, Baranek, & Tommerdahl, 2008), as well as 
decreased adaptation to face (Pellicano, Jeffery, Burr, & Rhodes, 2007) and number (Turi et al., 
2015) in ASD further provide support for this model, as adaptation relies on prior-based 
predictions.  
Understanding existing theoretical accounts of ASD through the attention-bias 
framework. The three leading cognitive theories of ASD reviewed above propose different 
mechanisms that may account for the social and non-social symptoms in this disorder. 
Nonetheless, they all postulate a common element, according to which there is an 
underutilization of internal knowledge, which limits the ability of affected individuals to 
formulate hypotheses and make adaptive predictions and interpretations of the world. In the 
current work, we propose a more fundamental deficit, that is, reduced internally-oriented 
attention (i.e., internal attention), that may account for the difficulty in utilizing internally-stored 
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information when interacting with the external world. Indeed, formulation of mental states of self 
and others, interpretation of information within a larger context and global meaning, and 
generation of perceptual hypotheses based on existing knowledge and past experience are all 
modulated by internal attention. Thus, heightened external attention and limited internal 
attention, as proposed by our attention-bias model of ASD, would provide a parsimonious 
account for each of these leading theories, by proposing a more fundamental mechanism that 
underlies the core elements of the disorder.   
Hypothesis and Objectives 
 Here, we propose that a core deficit in ASD is attentional in nature. According to our 
hypothesis, ASD is related to attention bias, where attention resources are excessively allocated 
to sensory information, limiting the capacity for internally-directed attention. According to this 
model, individuals with ASD are subjects to a vicious cycle, where heightened external attention 
limits accessibility of internal information (e.g., thoughts, memories, knowledge). This 
diminishes the individual’s ability to adaptively interpret the situation or environment, resulting 
in greater ambiguity and uncertainty. Subsequently, the environment is experienced as 
unpredictable and threatening, leading to enhanced external attention in order to increase 
processing of information from the external environment and reduce ambiguity. 
We believe that our attention-bias hypothesis provides a parsimonious account for ASD 
symptomatology; though likely not the sole explanation, this attention bias model may be related 
to each of the ASD characteristics. As attention is closely related to perception, excessive 
external attention with limited internal constraints can explain the atypical sensory processing in 
ASD. The resulting ambiguity and unpredictability of the external environment can explain the 
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desire for sameness that characterizes individuals with ASD and is linked to repetitive behavior 
and restricted interest, two of the core symptoms in this condition; by restricting the variability in 
the environment, ambiguity and uncertainty are also decreased. Finally, as social interactions are 
particularly complex and require rapid predictions and interpretations based on prior knowledge 
and experience, the attention-bias hypothesis would explain abnormal social behavior, which is a 
hallmark of ASD.    
Our hypothesis is closely related to the other leading cognitive models of ASD reviewed 
here, and suggests a more fundamental underlying mechanism that may provide explanation for 
each of the theories and a reconciliation between them. If individuals with ASD indeed 
excessively attend to sensory information at the expense of attending internally, as suggested by 
our hypothesis, it would decrease their ability to incorporate internally-stored information (e.g., 
knowledge and experience) in current perception and behavior. That could explain the different 
aspects of limitations and difficulties in individuals with ASD as described and demonstrated by 
the different models; i.e., deficits in the ability to infer mental states of self and others, to process 
and interpret information within a more general context, and to make predictions about the world 
based on prior knowledge.   
While recent and ongoing investigations into internal attention reveal its crucial role in 
typical cognition and behavior, the potential role of internal attention in ASD symptomatology 
has not yet been pursued. To test our hypothesis of attention-bias in ASD, a series of studies 
were designed and implemented, following three specific aims:  
Aim 1. Investigation of spontaneous orientation of attention internally and 
externally during rest in individuals with ASD and TDC. The aim of the first study (Study 1) 
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was to investigate spontaneous attention-orientation during rest (i.e., no task demands). Findings 
from our previous study of reduced SCR and altered correlations between SCR and brain activity 
during rest in participants with ASD suggest that these participants directed their attention 
externally, rather than internally, even in the absence of any external task. However, there was 
no direct assessment of attention-orientation during the rest period in that study. Therefore, in 
this study, attention-orientation probes were used to assess whether attention is spontaneously 
directed externally or internally during rest in participants with ASD, as compared to TDCs. 
Measures of SCR were also taken and correlated with attention-orientation. Based on findings 
from our previous study, it was predicted that the ASD group would have a lower number of 
total SCRs compared to the TDC group during rest. In terms of attention focus, it was predicted 
that the ASD group would report more externally-directed attention, while the TDC participants 
would report more internally-directed attention, during rest.  
Aim 2. Investigation of internal and external attention under minimal cognitive 
demands in individuals with ASD and TDC. The second study (Study 2) was designed to 
investigate spontaneous attention-orientation during a sustained attention task. Accumulating 
recent literature suggests that mind-wandering is a crucial component of adaptive cognition and 
behavior, as it plays an important role in integrating internal knowledge and past experience in 
the guidance of behavior. The purpose of this task was, therefore, to examine the tendency to 
mind-wander in participants with ASD, both objectively (i.e., task performance) and subjectively 
(i.e., self-reports). Furthermore, the source of distraction from the task (i.e., internal, external or 
interoceptive) was also examined. A modified version of the continuous performance task (CPT) 
was used in this study, with slow presentation of stimuli and decreased frequency of the target 
stimulus, to set cognitive demands at low levels and increase likelihood of mind-wandering. 
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Group differences in task performance and self-reported mind-wandering, as well as the source 
of distraction were examined. We predicted that participants in the ASD group would exhibit 
less mind-wandering and would be distracted to a greater extent by external stimuli, compared to 
the TDC group.  
Aim 3. Investigation of internal and external attention under internal and external 
demands in individuals with ASD and TDC. The purpose of the third study (Study 3) was to 
directly manipulate task-requirements for external versus internal orientation of attention, and 
examine voluntary attention-orientation, with and without competing external and internal 
information in ASD. The main goals of the task were to examine the capacity of individuals with 
ASD to attend internally when required to do so, and to explore whether their attention is biased 
towards external information when both internal and external information is present (which 
mimics more closely real-world information processing). To that end, a novel task was designed, 
requiring participants to access external (i.e., visual) or internal (i.e., knowledge, memory and 
imagery) information, and make a response with or without the presence of competing external 
or internal stimuli. We predicted that individuals with ASD would have greater difficulty to 
access internal information, and that their ability to attend internally would be further challenged 
by the presence of competing external information, as compared to TDCs.   
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Chapter III 
General Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen high functioning adults with ASD and 15 matched TDC were recruited for the 
study. The ASD participants were recruited through the Seaver Autism Center for Research and 
Treatment at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai (ISMMS), and the TDC participants 
were recruited from the Seaver Center’s matched control pool, Queens College, and ISMMS. All 
the ASD participants were evaluated by a psychiatrist and other trained clinicians at the Seaver 
Center. This diagnostic evaluation consisted of psychiatric, medical, and developmental 
assessments, as well as Intelligence Quotient (IQ) measurement using the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, third or fourth editions (WAIS-III/IV) (Wechsler, 1997). Diagnoses of ASD 
was determined by a psychiatric interview following the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for 
Mental Disorders, Fourth or Fifth Edition  (DSM-IV-TR/DSM-5), and confirmed by the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G; (Lord et al., 2000)), as well as the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994)). Exclusion criteria 
included history of epilepsy, substance/alcohol abuse or dependence, or schizophrenia. 
Additional exclusion criteria include history of any genetic, congenital or systemic medical 
disorders, as well as any head injury with loss of consciousness or other neurological disorder. 
For the TDC group, participants were excluded based on psychiatric, neurological or systemic 
medical disorders, or history in first-degree relatives of developmental disorders (including 
autism and ADHD), learning disabilities, affective disorders, and anxiety disorders. All TDC 
participants were screened for past or present psychiatric disorders using the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV), and their IQ was evaluated using the Wechsler 
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Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, second edition (WASI-II; Wechsler & Hsiao-pin, 2011), or 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, fourth edition (WAIS-IV) (Wechsler, 1997). All 
participants were high-functioning with Full-Scale IQ scores falling within normal limits (i.e., 
FSIQ < 80). Table 1 shows the demographic data of the two samples. An independent sample t-
test was performed to rule-out any significant differences in age and IQ between the groups 
(Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1. Demographic data (means ± SD) of ASD and TDC groups.  
 
Subject characteristics ASD 
(n = 16) 
TDC 
(n = 15) 
t p 
Age (years) 32.6 ± 6.7 30.1 ± 8.6 0.92 .36 
Full Scale IQ 102.5 ± 13.28 99.8 ± 11.34 0.61 .55 
SRS 63.56 ± 11.56 48.27 ± 8.13 4.24 < .001 
AQ 27.50 ± 6.23 13.27 ± 5.57 6.69 < .001 
EQ 30.31 ± 10.01 49.60 ± 10.66 5.20 < .001 
ADOS-G      
   Communication a 3.1 ± 1.5    
   Social 
   Social +Communication a 
6.1 ± 2.6 
9.3 ± 2.9 
   
   Imagination b 0.8 ± 0.8    
   Stereotyped behaviors 
   Total 
2.2 ± 1.8 
18.6 ± 8.0 
   
Note: a ADOS Communication and Social subscales scores were not available for three participants, 
therefore n = 13 for these measures. b ADOS Imagination subscale scores were not available for one 
participant, therefore n = 12 for this measure.  
 
All participants provided written informed consent, approved by the Icahn School of 
Medicine at Mount Sinai Institutional Review Board, as well as by the Queens College 
Institutional Review Board. Participant’s data was decoded and deidentified; all identifiable 
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information was kept in locked cabinets in the lab.   
Measures of ASD-related Traits 
 Several questionnaires assessing ASD-related traits were administered to participants in 
both groups to allow explorational analysis of possible relationships between severity of ASD 
traits in both affected and unaffected individuals and internal and external orientation of 
attention. Three well-validated questionnaires that are commonly used in clinical research of 
ASD were utilized in the current study; the Social Responsiveness Scale, second edition (SRS-
2), the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), and the Empathy Quotient (EQ). 
The Social Responsiveness Scale, second edition (SRS-2). The SRS-2 is a 65-item, 4-
point rating scale (1 = “not true,” 2 = “sometimes true,” 3 = “often true,” and 4 = “almost always 
true”) that assesses for ASD-related symptoms across five different domains; social awareness, 
social cognition, social communication, social motivation, and restricted interests and repetitive 
behavior (Bruni, Constantino, & Gruber, 2014). A total score of T ≤ 59 is considered to be 
within normal limits, whereas higher T-scores suggest mild (T = 60-65), moderate (T = 66-75), 
or severe (T ≥ 76) social deficits. Evaluation of validity and reliability of the SRS-2 
demonstrated an internal consistency ranging between .94 and .96, a test-retest reliability ranging 
between .94 and .96, interrater reliability ranging between .61 and .92, and predictive validity of 
.92 (Bruni et al., 2014).  
 The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). The AQ is a 50-item self-report assessing five 
domains of ASD-related behavior: social skills, attention switching, attention to detail, 
communication, and imagination (S. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001). The participants rate their answers on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “definitely agree,” 2 = 
“slightly agree,” 3 = “slightly disagree,” and 4 = “definitely disagree”). A score of 32 or higher 
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suggest high degree of autistic traits at a clinically significant level (i.e., 80% of individuals with 
ASD, but only 2% of TDC, scored at this range). Test-retest reliability is .7, and internal 
consistency ranges between .63 and .77 (S. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
 The Empathy Quotient (EQ). The EQ is a self-report questionnaire that includes 40 
empathy-related items and 20 control items (S. Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Here too, 
participants rate their answers on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “definitely agree,” 2 = “slightly 
agree,” 3 = “slightly disagree,” and 4 = “definitely disagree”). Assessment of this instrument in 
high-functioning adults with ASD and matched TDC showed that the ASD group scored 
significantly lower than the TDC group, and 81.1% of ASD individuals scored ≤ 30, compared to 
only 12.2% of the control group (S. Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Thus, the EQ is 
another useful measure to assess the degree or severity of ASD traits.  
General Procedure 
All the participants completed all 4 tasks and questionnaires for the different studies, 
following the same order. The study was conducted in one session (lasting approximately 5 
hours) at our lab in the ISMMS. The participants were encouraged to take multiple breaks during 
the session and received a 45-minute lunch break at the middle of the session. All tasks were 
programmed and ran using E-Prime version 2.0 TM software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA), and were displayed on a 17” screen. Noise cancelling headphones were used for 
all tasks.  
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Chapter IV 
Study 1: Spontaneous Internal and External Attention during Rest 
Introduction 
 The aim of Study 1 was to investigate internal and external orientation of attention in a 
state of rest (without any task demands) in individuals with ASD and TDC. In a previous 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study, we looked at autonomic fluctuations and 
brain activity during rest in high-functioning adults with ASD and matched TDC (Eilam-Stock et 
al., 2014). We observed that participants with ASD had, on average, fewer numbers of non-
specific (non-task related) SCRs during the entire scan (i.e., 6 minutes; Figure 1.1). Strikingly, 
we found that while autonomic fluctuations were correlated with frontal midline structures, 
typically involved in self-referential processing (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) in the control 
group, they were correlated with sensory cortices (primarily visual and auditory) in the ASD 
group (Figure 1.2). It has been shown that SCR is a sensitive indicator of autonomic fluctuations, 
and can be triggered by subtle changes driven by mental activity and thought processes (Nikula, 
1991). Taken together, one compelling explanation for these results is that while resting in the 
MRI scanner, TDC participants were mostly engaged in self-referential mentation, whereas ASD 
participants directed their attention externally (e.g., the visual environment and noises from the 
scanner), even in the absence of any external task.  
The current study was designed to directly investigate the nature of the mental processes 
that drive autonomic activity during rest in individuals with ASD and TDC. More generally, 
SCR was utilized in this study as an indicator of mental activity to gain a better understanding of 
possible differences in foci of attention (i.e., external or internal) between the groups, in the 
absence of task constraints or attentional demands. To that end, participants were asked to sit 
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comfortably in front of a computer screen and fixate their gaze on a crosshair at the center of the 
screen. In one condition (SCR condition), a thought probe appeared on the screen when SCR was 
detected, asking the participants what was at the center of their attention just before the probe 
appeared (i.e., at SCR initiation). As the ASD group was hypothesized to have significantly 
fewer SCRs, in accordance with results from our previous study, a second condition was added 
(Random condition), in which thought probes appeared on the screen at random times, 
approximately once every 60 seconds. Following our hypotheses and previous findings, we 
predicted that (1) ASD participants would have fewer SCRs during the entire task, compared to 
TDC, (2) ASD participants would report a higher degree of external focus of attention overall, 
compared to TDC, and (3) the differences in external versus internal foci of attention between 
the groups would be greater in the SCR condition, compared to the Random condition.   
Methods 
Task paradigm 
For the Resting-State Task, participants were instructed to sit comfortably in front of a 
computer screen and focus their gaze at a crosshair at the center of the screen. The participants 
were told that at random times (and not very often), a thought probe will appear on the screen, 
asking them what was at the center of their attention just before the probe appeared. Each time, 
they will need to choose one of four options: (1) something in the external environment 
(External), (2) bodily sensation (Interoceptive), (3) thought, memory, or concern (Internal), or 
(4) I don't know or nothing in particular (DK). The participants made their choices by pressing 
the key that corresponded to the number of the desired answer on the keyboard. To promote 
correct classification, all participants underwent a practice session before task administration, 
where the experimenter explained each of the answer-choices and provided examples. The 
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participants were then given a list of 20 possible examples, which they had to classify according 
to the four options, and any errors were corrected and explained by the experimenter (Appendix 
A). The participants then received a practice trial that included a short period of rest (10 seconds) 
followed by a thought probe.  
Skin conductance was measured via two electrodes attached to the palmar surface of two 
fingers (index and middle fingers of the non-dominant hand) and was recorded and processed in 
real time through the BIOPAC system (see below for a detailed description). The quality of SCR 
recording was tested before the initiation of the task, by asking the participants to breathe deeply 
and squeeze their hand, which universally should trigger SCR; online SCR detection was 
verified.  
The task was comprised of four 12-minute blocks; two blocks for the Random condition, 
and two blocks for the SCR condition. In each condition (Random and SCR), Group (2 levels; 
ASD and TDC) was the between-subject factor and Attention (4 levels; External, Interoceptive, 
Internal, and DK, corresponding with the 4 possible responses) was the within-subject factor. For 
the Random condition, 12 probes appeared on the screen approximately once per minute at 
quasi-randomized times, regardless of SCR detection. For the SCR condition, the experimenter 
initiated the probes whenever SCR was detected, under the following conditions: (1) no probe 
appeared in the first 60 seconds of the task, (2) no probe appeared in the 20 seconds following 
the previous probe, and (3) no probe appeared if the detected SCR was movement-related (as 
judged by the experimenter).  
Skin conductance response acquisition and on-line detection. SCR was recorded using 
the GSR100C amplifier (BIOPAC Systems, Goleta, CA), together with the base module MP150 
and the AcqKnowledge software (version 4.2). The GSR100C measures skin conductance by 
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applying a constant voltage of 0.5 V between two electrodes that are attached to the skin. This 
allows for the measurements of SCR, which vary with sweat gland activity due to stress, arousal, 
or emotional excitement. Skin conductance (measured in μS) was recorded using a 2000-Hz 
sampling rate (gain = 2 μS/V, both high pass filters = DC, low pass filter = 10 Hz). After 
cleaning the skin with alcohol preps, two EL507 disposable EDA (isotonic gel) electrodes were 
placed on the palmar surface of the middle phalanges of the index and middle fingers of the non-
dominant hand. The skin conductance data was visualized in real time on a running graph on the 
experimenter’s screen (behind the participant) and an SCR-detection algorithm was utilized to 
determine SCR in an objective, standardized fashion. The algorithm derived a phasic skin 
conductance (by high-pass filtering the tonic skin conductance) and identified places where the 
phasic skin conductance raised above a predetermined detection threshold (0.02 µS). To that end, 
multiple subchannels performed online calculations in succession, ultimately enabling the real-
time detection of SCR.  (see Appendix B for a detailed description of the different subchannels 
of the algorithm).   
Data analysis 
 Skin conductance analysis. AcqKnowledge software (version 4.2) was used in order to 
identify and count SCRs. In short, the algorithm created an estimated phasic SCR waveform 
from the existing tonic one (i.e., skin conductance level), by implementing high-pass filtering 
(using a 0.05 Hz high-pass filter) to remove noise from the original signal. SCRs were then 
identified using the electrodermal activity algorithm of the AcqKnowledge software (see above 
and Appendix B for details). The number of valid SCRs (following at least 20 seconds from the 
previous response and non-movement related) was counted for each of the participants. 
Difference between the ASD and TDC groups in the total number of SCRs during the SCR runs 
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(24 minutes) was assessed using a one-tailed independent samples t-test. 
 Attention orientation with SCR-related sampling analysis. To test our predictions 
regarding spontaneous orientation of attention during rest, the number of responses to each of the 
four possible answers on the attention-orientation probes (i.e., External, Interoceptive, Internal, 
or ‘Don’t know’ (DK)) was quantified for each of the participants. SCR-related sampling of 
attention orientation was examined using a two-way mixed-model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with Group (2 levels; ASD and TDC) as the between-subject factor and Attention (4 
levels; External, Interoceptive, Internal, and DK) as the within-subject factor.  
According to our attention model, both external and interoceptive attention are subtypes 
of external attention, as both convey sensory inputs from the external and visceral environments 
(respectively) to the brain, through sensory afferents. Therefore, an additional mixed-model 
ANOVA tested between-group differences, comparing the combined (averaged) External and 
Interoceptive responses to the number of Internal responses. 
Finally, since participants differed in the number of SCRs they had during the SCR runs, 
the number of samples under this condition varied considerably between participants. Therefore, 
the ratio of each response to the total number of responses was also calculated for each 
participant in the SCR condition and between group differences were tested with a mixed-model 
ANOVA procedure. 
Attention orientation with random sampling. To assess spontaneous orientation of 
attention during rest with random experience sampling (i.e., non-SCR related), a mixed-model 
ANOVA was performed with Group as the between-subject variable and the number of 
responses for each of the possible answers on the attention-orientation probes during the Random 
runs (24 samples) as the within-subject variable. 
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Correlational analysis with clinical symptoms and traits. Exploratory non-parametric 
correlation analyses were performed to examine relationships between self-reported external and 
internal attention during rest and ASD traits (as captured by the questionnaires) and symptom 
severity (as measured by the ADOS). Kendall’s tau correlation analyses were conducted between 
the average number of External (External and Interoceptive combined) and Internal responses in 
the Random condition, and scores on the SRS, AQ, and EQ. For the ASD groups, correlation 
analysis was also performed between External and Internal responses and ADOS Social and 
Communication scores and the ADOS Total scores. 
All data analyses were conducted using SPSS version 25.0 (IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Windows, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). Graphic representations of the data were performed using 
GraphPad Prism version 7.00 (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA).  
Results 
 Skin conductance responses. No significant between-group difference was identified in 
the total number of SCRs (t(29) = 1.56, p = .065). Contrary to our predictions and previous 
findings, however, the ASD group had more SCRs overall (M = 28.13, SD = 13.65) compared to 
the TDC group (M = 20.73, SD = 12.73; Figure 4.1).    
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Attention orientation with SCR-related sampling. Results indicated a significant main 
effect of Attention (F(3,87) = 14.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .34), but no main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 
2.42, p = .13) or a Group by Attention interaction (F(3,87) = 1.27, p = .29). A planned contrast 
comparison revealed that participants across groups reported significantly more Internal attention 
(M = 12.61, SD = 10.52) compared to External (M = 4.81, SD = 5.2, F(1,29) = 12.92, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .31), Interoceptive (M = 5.0, SD = 3.94, F(1,29) = 16.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and DK (M = 
2.13, SD = 4.35, F(1,29) = 23.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .45) responses (Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.1. Total number of SCRs during SCR runs (24 minutes). 
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A mixed-model ANOVA comparing the combined External and Interoceptive responses 
to the Internal responses revealed a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 15.33, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .35), indicating that participants across groups reported more Internal orientation of 
attention (M = 12.61, SD = 10.52) than External and Interoceptive combined (M = 4.90, SD = 
3.57). No main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 1.84, p = .19), or a Group by Attention interaction 
(F(1,29) = 2.0, p = .17) were found (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.2. Attention orientation in the SCR condition. 
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Finally, a mixed-model ANOVA using the ratio scores, rather than the pure averages for 
each of the responses, revealed a significant main effect of Attention (F(3,87) = 15.79, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .35), but no main effect of Group (F(1,29) = .002, p = .96) or a Group by Attention 
interaction (F(3,87) = 1.59, p = .20). A planned contrast comparison revealed that participants 
across groups reported significantly more Internal attention (M = 44.96, SD = 27.53) compared 
to External (M = 18.62, SD = 18.25, F(1,29) = 14.62, p = .001, ηp2 = .34), Interoceptive (M = 
22.81, SD = 19.42, F(1,29) = 10.43, p = .003, ηp2 = .27) and DK (M = 7.16, SD = 13.05, F(1,29) 
= 37.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .56) responses (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.3. Attention orientation with combined external and 
interoceptive scores in the SCR condition. 
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When percentages of Internal responses were compared to combined percentages of 
External and Interoceptive responses, a mixed-model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of Attention (F(1,29) = 14.463, p = .001, ηp2 = .33), where participants across groups reported 
significantly more Internal orientation of attention (M = 44.96, SD = 27.53) compared to 
External and Interoceptive combined responses (M = 20.71, SD = 12.67). No main effect of 
Group (F(1,29) = .13, p =.72), or a Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = 1.97, p = .17) were 
found (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.4. Attention orientation in the SCR condition, represented as 
percent out of the total number of responses for each participant. 
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Attention orientation with random sampling. Similar to the results in the SCR 
condition, a significant main effect of Attention was found (F(3,87) = 14.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .34), 
but no main effect of Group (F(1,29) = .00) or a Group by Attention interaction (F(3,87) = .34, p 
= .80). A planned contrast comparison revealed that participants across groups reported 
significantly more Internal attention (M = 10.84, SD = 5.47) compared to External (M = 6.13, SD 
= 5.61, F(1,29) = 6.51, p = .016, ηp2 = .18), Interoceptive (M = 5.19, SD = 3.6, F(1,29) = 20.52, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .41) and DK (M = 1.84, SD = 3.20, F(1,29) = 49.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .63) responses 
(Figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.5. Attention orientation with combined external and interoceptive scores in 
the SCR condition, represented in percent out of total responses for each participant. 
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A mixed-model ANOVA comparing averages of Internal responses to External and 
Interoceptive combined responses revealed a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
13.45, p = .001, ηp2 = .32), where participants across groups reported more Internal responses on 
average (M = 10.84, SD = 5.47), compared to External and Interoceptive responses combined (M 
= 5.66, SD = 2.72). No main effect of Group (F(1,29) = .49, p = .49) or a Group by Attention 
interaction (F(3,87) = .66, p = .42) were found (Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.6. Attention orientation in the Random condition. 
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Correlations with clinical symptoms and traits. A significant correlation was found 
between self-reported external attention and ADOS Social and Communication scores (Tb = .39, 
p = .05), such that greater number of External responses were associated with higher scores on 
the ADOS Social and Communication scales. No other significant correlations were identified 
between the number of External and Internal responses and scores on the SRS, AQ, EQ, or 
ADOS Total scores.  
Discussion 
 This study examined spontaneous orientation of attention in high functioning adults with 
ASD and TDC in the absence of any external or internal task demands. This study was designed 
as a direct continuation of our previous study, looking at SCRs and brain activity during rest in 
Figure 4.7. Attention orientation with combined external and 
interoceptive scores in the Random condition. 
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ASD. As our previous findings indicated reduced numbers of SCRs during rest in individuals 
with ASD, as well as correlations with sensory cortices (as opposed to cortical midline structures 
in the TDC group), we expected to replicate findings of reduced SCR frequency in the ASD 
group, and predicted that this activity would be associated with self-reported external focus of 
attention in ASD participants. In accordance with our hypothesis of reduced internal attention in 
ASD overall, we further predicted increased self-reported external attention in the ASD group 
overall, regardless of autonomic arousal (i.e., with random sampling). Contrary to our 
predictions and previous findings, however, the results of the current study indicated higher 
numbers of SCRs in the ASD group compared to controls, although this effect was not 
statistically significant. Moreover, both ASD and TDC participants reported significantly more 
internal attention during the task, with no significant differences between the groups, or a Group 
by Attention interaction. This pattern of results was obtained for both the SCR-related and 
random sampling.  
 One possible explanation for the current findings is that in the absence of external 
stimulation/distraction, individuals with ASD direct their attention internally, similarly to 
typically-developing individuals. After all, our previous study was conducted within the MRI 
scanner; despite being a ‘resting-state’ scan with no task demands, the participants were exposed 
to a great degree of noise from the scanner during the scan and were ‘resting’ in an unfamiliar 
external environment. By contrast, in the current study, the participants set comfortably in a quiet 
room with noise-cancelling headphones and no visual stimulation. Therefore, it is possible that 
the difference in the degree of external stimulation may account for the discrepancy in findings 
between the two studies.  
 One limitation of the current task is that it mostly relies on self-reports. In order to report 
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whether one’s attention is directed internally or externally at a given moment, a certain degree of 
self-awareness is required. Several studies have demonstrated limited self-awareness in ASD 
(Hobson et al., 2006; Lombardo et al., 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). Thus, 
it may be that the insignificant results obtained by this study are not a true reflection of internal 
and external attention orientation in ASD, rather, they are influenced by the degree of self-
awareness of the participants, which may be reduced in ASD. Another limitation of the study is 
the small sample size. As mentioned above, small sample sizes can hinder true between-group 
differences, particularly in the study of ASD, where vast within-group variability is expected due 
to the heterogeneity of the samples (Eilam-Stock et al., 2016). Finally, the hypothesis and 
predictions that are at the core of the current resting-state study (Study 1), stem from one 
possible interpretation of our previous resting-state fMRI study, where autonomic fluctuations 
were correlated with midline structures in the TDC group, but with sensory cortices in the ASD 
group (Eilam-Stock et al., 2014). As no direct measure of attention orientation was implemented 
in the previous study, other mechanisms, which may not be related to attention orientation, may 
accounted for our previous results (e.g., differences in central pathways of autonomic signal 
processing). 
 In sum, the findings from the current study do not support our hypothesis of reduced 
internal attention in ASD, and are inconsistent with our predictions of reduced autonomic arousal 
and increased external orientation of attention during rest in individuals with ASD. The 
significant correlation found between self-reported external attention and ADOS Social and 
Communication scores suggest, however, that there may be a relationship between impaired 
social skills and external orientation of attention.    
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Chapter V 
Study 2: Internal and External Attention under Minimal Cognitive Demands   
Introduction 
 The goal of this study was twofold; first, investigating mind wandering frequency in 
individuals with ASD, compared to TDC, and second, identifying potential group differences in 
the direction to which the mind wanders when it is not completely focused on a task (i.e., internal 
vs. external distraction). To that end, a simplified, slower version of the Continuous Performance 
Task (CPT) was implemented to foster mind wandering while the participants are engaged in an 
external task with minimal cognitive demands (see details below). This modifies version of the 
CPT was chosen for this study as it minimizes the need for a response inhibition capacity 
compared to other tasks previously used in mind-wandering research (e.g., sustained attention to 
response task; (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009)), which may be 
compromised in individuals with ASD (Agam, Joseph, Barton, & Manoach, 2010; Geurts, van 
den Bergh, & Ruzzano, 2014; Kana, Keller, Minshew, & Just, 2007). During the task, probes 
appeared on the screen at random times, asking the participants if their mind was “on-task” or 
“off-task” just before the probe appeared (i.e., Mind-wandering probes), and whether their 
attention was directed internally or externally (i.e., Attention probes). The advantage in using 
such a task is that it provides both objective (i.e., reaction time, accuracy and efficiency) and 
subjective (i.e., self-report probes) measures of mind wandering. We predicted that (1) ASD 
participants would be more focused on the task, and as such, would have greater accuracy and 
efficiency, as well as faster reaction times, (2) ASD participants would report less mind-
wandering than TDC participants on the mind-wandering probes, and (3) participants with ASD 
would report more external distraction on the attention probes, compared to TDC participants.    
 
 
48  
Methods 
Task paradigm 
 For this task, the participants were asked to sit comfortably and fixate their gaze on a 
crosshair at the center of the screen. Different letters of the English alphabet were presented at 
the center of the screen at a quasi-randomized order every 3000ms for a 1000ms duration. The 
letter ‘X’ was presented 7.4% of the time (twice for every alphabetic order). The participants 
were instructed to click the mouse as soon as they detect the letter ‘X,’ but withhold response to 
any other letters. Following a short practice trial of the task (10 trials, two of which with the 
letter ‘X’), the participants were told that at random times (and not very often) a probe would 
appear on the screen, asking them whether their mind was “on-task” or “off-task” just before the 
probe appeared. For each probe, the participants were asked to select one of the following 4 
options: (1) completely on-task, (2) mostly on-task, (3) mostly off-task, or (4) completely off-
task, by pressing the corresponding number on the keyboard. As this study predicts differences in 
foci of attention (i.e., external vs. internal) between the groups, in addition to differences in 
mind-wandering frequency, if the participant’s response was not ‘completely on task,’ a second 
probe appeared, asking them where else was their attention focused just before the first probe 
appeared. Again, the participants were asked to select one of four options: (1) something in the 
external environment (External), (2) bodily sensation (Interoceptive), (3) thought, memory, or 
concern (Internal), or (4) I don't know or nothing in particular (DK). A short practice trial was 
administered to insure the participants’ understanding of the task.  
The task was comprised of four 12-minute blocks, with 14 presentations of the letter ‘X’ 
and 12 probes in each block (approximately one probe per minute). Group (2 levels; ASD and 
TDC) was the between-subject variable, and Mind-Wandering (4 levels; Completely ON, Mostly 
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ON, Mostly OFF and Completely OFF) and Attention (4 levels; External, Interoceptive, Internal, 
and DK) were the within-subject variables.  
Data analysis 
 Task performance analysis. Performance on the X-CPT was measured in terms of 
accuracy (percent of correct responses), reaction time (RT), and efficiency (Accuracy/RT; the 
probability of accurate response per unit of time in seconds) for each of the participants. One-
tailed independent-sample t-tests were performed to test between-group differences on these 
different measures. 
Mind-wandering analysis. To test differences in self-reported mind-wandering between 
the groups, the number of responses for each of the four possible answers in the Mind-
Wandering probes was quantified for each of the participants (48 samples). A mixed-model 
ANOVA was then utilized with Group as the between-subject variable, and Mind-Wandering (4 
levels; Completely ON, Mostly ON, Mostly OFF and Completely OFF) as the within-subject 
variable.  
Attention orientation analysis. To test our predictions regarding the source of 
interference (i.e., external vs. internal) during mind wandering, the number of responses to each 
of the four possible answers on the Attention probes (i.e., External, Interoceptive, Internal, and 
‘Don’t Know’) was quantified for each of the participants. A mixed-model ANOVA was used, 
with Group as the between-subject factor, and each of the four answer categories as the within-
subject factor. As mentioned above, according to our attention model, both external and 
interoceptive attention are subtypes of external attention, as both convey sensory inputs from the 
external and visceral environments (respectively) to the brain, through sensory afferents. 
Therefore, an additional mixed-model ANOVA tested between-group differences, comparing the 
 
 
50  
combined (averaged) External and Interoceptive responses to Internal responses. Finally, since 
each of the participants had a different number of attention probe samples, depending on their 
answers to the mind-wandering probe (i.e., if the answer to the mind-wandering probe was 
‘Completely ON,’ attention probe was not consequently administered), an additional analysis 
was performed, taking into account the percentage (i.e., ratio) of each of the responses out of the 
total number of attention probe samples for each participant, rather than the pure averages. 
Correlational analysis with clinical symptoms and traits. Exploratory non-parametric 
correlation analyses (Kendall’s tau-b) were conducted between efficiency scores on the X-CPT, 
the average number of Completely On responses in the mind-wandering probes, External 
(External and Interoceptive combined) and Internal responses in the attention probes, and scores 
on the SRS, AQ, and EQ, as well as ADOS Social and Communication scores and the ADOS 
Total scores for the ASD group. 
All data analyses were conducted using SPSS version 25.0 (IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Windows, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). Graphic representations of the data were performed using 
GraphPad Prism version 7.00 (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA).  
Results 
 Task performance. A significant between-group difference was found in RT, indicating 
that contrary to our predictions, the ASD group was significantly slower in responding to target 
letters (M = 600.38, SD = 89.81) compared to the TDC group (M = 522.93, SD = 62.78), t(29) = 
2.77, p = .005 (Figure 5.1). In terms of Accuracy, there was no significant difference between the 
ASD (M = 99.73, SD = .27) and the TDC (M = 99.78, SD = .24) groups, t(29) = .56, p = .29 
(Figure 5.2). Finally, a significant between-group difference was also found in efficiency, 
indicating that contrary to our predictions, the ASD group had significantly lower efficiency (M 
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= 1.70, SD = .27) compared to the TDC group (M = 1.94, SD = .06), t(29) = 2.53, p = .009 
(Figure 5.3).  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.1. Performance on the X-CPT in terms of RT. 
Figure 5.2. Performance on the X-CPT in terms of accuracy. 
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Self-reported mind-wandering. Results indicated a significant main effect of Mind-
Wandering (F(3,87) = 24.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .46), but no main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 0.00) 
or a Group by Mind-Wandering interaction (F(3,87) = 1.38, p = .25). A planned contrast 
comparison revealed that participants across groups reported being ‘Completely ON task’ (M = 
23.61, SD = 15.81) significantly more than being ‘Mostly OFF task’ (M = 4.68, SD = 7.43, 
F(1,29) = 25.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .47), or ‘Completely OFF task’ (M = .71, SD = 2.47, F(1,29) = 
59.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .67). There was no significant difference in the average number of 
Completely ON and Mostly ON responses across groups (M = 19.0, SD = 12.42, F(1,29) = 1.00, 
p = .325) (Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.3. Performance on the X-CPT in terms of efficiency. 
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Self-reported attention orientation. The results indicated a significant main effect of 
Attention (F(3,87) = 27.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .48), but no main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 1.77, p = 
.19) or a Group by Attention interaction (F(3,87) = .58, p = .63). A planned contrast comparison 
revealed that participants across groups reported significantly more Internal attention (M = 15.61, 
SD = 12.33) compared to External (M = 2.35, SD = 4.88, F(1,29) = 29.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .50), 
Interoceptive (M = 5.77, SD = 5.85, F(1,29) = 16.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and ‘Don’t Know’ (M = 
.65, SD = 1.47, F(1,29) = 46.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .62) responses (Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.4. Mind-wandering during the X-CPT. 
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A mixed-model ANOVA comparing the combined averaged External and Interoceptive 
responses to Internal responses revealed a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 23.53, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .45), indicating that participants across groups reported more internal orientation 
of attention (M = 15.61, SD = 12.33) compared to External and Interoceptive combined 
responses (M = 4.06, SD = 4.63). No main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 1.62, p = .213), or a Group 
by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = .10, p = .752) were found (Figure 5.6).  
Figure 5.5. Attention orientation as a source of interference during the X-CPT. 
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A mixed-model ANOVA using the ratio scores for each of the participants revealed a 
significant main effect of Attention (F(3,87) = 30.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .51), but no main effect of 
Group (F(1,29) = 1.99, p = .17) or a Group by Attention interaction (F(3,87) = .22, p = .88). A 
planned contrast comparison revealed that participants across groups reported significantly more 
Internal attention (M = 56.66, SD = 32.29) compared to External (M = 7.65, SD = 11.92, F(1,29) 
= 51.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .64), Interoceptive (M = 26.8, SD = 27.28, F(1,29) = 9.08, p = .005, ηp2 = 
.24) and DK (M = 2.45, SD = 5.94, F(1,29) = 83.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .74) responses (Figure 5.7).  
Figure 5.6. Attention orientation with combined external and interoceptive scores. 
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When percentages of Internal responses were compared to combined percentages of 
External and Interoceptive responses, a mixed-model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of attention (F(1,29) = 23.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .45), where participants across groups reported 
significantly more Internal orientation of attention (M = 56.66, SD = 32.29) compared to 
External and Interoceptive combined responses (M = 17.23, SD = 15.31). No main effect of 
Group (F(1,29) = .305, p =.59), or a Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = .02, p = .88) were 
found (Figure 5.8). 
Figure 5.7. Attention orientation represented as percent out of the 
total number of responses for each participant. 
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Correlations with clinical symptoms and traits. Performance on the X-CPT task, as 
measured by efficiency, was negatively correlated with ADOS Total scores (Tb = -.39, p = .041) 
and AQ scores (Tb = -.25, p = .050), and positively correlated with EQ scores (Tb = .37, p = 
.004). Significant correlations were also found between no mind-wandering (i.e., Completely On 
responses) and scores on the SRS (Tb = -.35, p = .006), EQ (Tb = .29, p = .026), and marginally 
on the AQ (Tb = -.25, p = .054), such that greater number of Completely ON responses were 
associated with lower scores on the SRS and AQ, and higher EQ scores. In addition, internal 
distraction was negatively correlated with ADOS Social and Communication scores (Tb = -.52, p 
= .010), and marginally negatively correlated with EQ scores (Tb = -.25, p = .056). Finally, self-
reported external distraction was marginally correlated with scores on the SRS (Tb = .24, p = 
.065), such that greater numbers of EA responses were associated with higher scores on the SRS. 
Figure 5.8. Attention orientation with combined external and interoceptive scores, 
represented in percent out of total responses for each participant. 
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Discussion 
 This study was designed to investigate the tendency to mind-wander when minimal 
external demands are present and the required allocation of attention to external information is 
low. Furthermore, the source of distraction from the task (external vs. internal) was also 
examined. In accordance with our hypothesis of increased external attention in ASD, we 
predicted that individuals with ASD would be more focused on the task, and hence, would 
demonstrate better task performance (objective measure) and reduced self-reported mind-
wandering (subjective measure) compared to TDC participants during this simplified version of 
the X-CPT. Contrary to our predictions, however, the ASD group had slower, less efficient 
performance on the X-CPT. In terms of accuracy, there was no difference between the groups, 
possibly due to a ceiling effect. In addition, participants in both groups reported being on-task 
significantly more than being off-task with no group differences, indicating that the subjective 
experience of mind-wandering did not differ between the groups. Thus, our predictions regarding 
reduced mind-wandering in ASD under minimal external demand were not supported by these 
data. Finally, similar to our findings in Study 1 (i.e., resting-state task), no statistically significant 
between-group differences were found in attention orientation, such that participants in both 
groups were more distracted by internal, rather than external sources of information. 
 The findings of the current study do not support our hypothesis of increased external 
attention in ASD, relative to TDC. Task performance, which was used as an objective indicator 
of mind-wandering was, in fact, worse in the ASD group, compared to the TDC group. As no 
statistical evidence for differences in subjective reports of mind-wandering between the groups 
was found, it is possible that the difference in task performance reflects an overall slower, less-
efficient cognitive processing in ASD, rather than a difference in the tendency to mind-wander. 
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This is consistent with previous studies indicating an overall reduced cognitive processing 
efficiency in ASD (Mackie & Fan, 2016). Moreover, accuracy in X-CPT performance was close 
to 100% in both groups, indicating a ceiling effect. It is possible, therefore, that the task was 
over-simplified, not challenging enough to capture existing group-differences.  
 Results from the correlation analyses with the clinical symptoms/traits should be 
interpreted with caution due to the small sample-size. However, they further suggest that, 
contrary to our hypothesis, increased mind wandering is associated with increased ASD traits. 
Interestingly, however, external distraction was positively associated with ASD traits, while 
internal distraction was negatively associated with ASD traits/symptoms. Moreover, these 
correlations were specific to the social-emotional domain (i.e., SRS, ADOS Social and 
Communication scales, and EQ). Finally, efficiency on the X-CPT was negatively correlated 
with ASD symptoms (i.e., ADOS Total) and traits (i.e., AQ), and positively correlated with EQ, 
further suggesting that ASD is related to reduced cognitive efficiency.       
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Chapter VI 
Study 3: Internal and External Attention under Internal and External Cognitive Demands 
Introduction 
 The goal of the third study was to directly examine the ability of individuals with ASD to 
voluntarily direct their attention internally or externally when required to do so, and the potential 
interference effects of incongruency, as well as conflicting internal and external information. To 
that end, we designed a novel task, where participants were presented with pictures (External 
Attention condition; EA) or names (Internal Attention condition; IA) of common objects, and 
were asked to make judgements about a physical property of the objects (e.g., does a certain 
animal have wings). In the EA condition, participants could look for the information in the 
picture presented in front of them, and therefore, directed their attention externally. In the IA 
condition, participants had to recruit their semantic memory system (i.e., funds of knowledge), or 
utilize mental imagery, both require an internal orientation of attention. To measure the effects of 
interference, congruency was manipulated as well (see details below). In addition, the effects of 
conflicting internal and external information were studied by administering two versions of the 
task; one version with no internal-external conflict (No-Conflict version), and another version in 
which conflicting information was conveyed to the participants through both internal and 
external sources (Conflict version).   
Methods 
Task paradigm 
 In this Internal-External Attention Task, participants were presented with either pictures 
or names of common objects, two at a time. Stimuli were chosen from the Snodgrass’ 
standardized picture set (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980), and were presented on the screen for 
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3000 ms at the beginning of each trial, allowing for sufficient processing of the information. 
Then, a question was presented on the screen while one of the objects was framed in red, 
signifying to the participants which of the two is the target object. The question asked about a 
visual property of the target object (e.g., “4 legs?”). In congruent trials, both objects had the 
same targeted property in common (e.g., both had 4 legs), facilitating a rapid Yes/No response; 
in incongruent trials, the objects differed in the targeted property (e.g., one had 4 legs, and the 
other had 2 legs), thus, creating interference. On EA trials, stimuli were presented in pictures; 
therefore, participants had to focus their attention on the visual properties of the stimulus to 
retrieve the information. On IA trials, stimuli were presented by their names; therefore, 
participants were required to access internal information (semantic knowledge and mental 
imagery) to answer the question (Figure 6.1). To examine attention-bias during simultaneous 
processing of external and internal information, a second version of the task was administered 
(Conflict version), in which mixed trials with one picture and one name were presented. In EA-
mixed trials, the target stimulus was the picture, and the distractor stimulus was the name. In IA-
mixed trials, the name was the target stimulus and the picture was the distractor (Figure 6.2).  
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 Figure 6.1. Internal-External Attention Task – No Conflict version. 
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The task was comprised of 256 trials over 4 runs (64 trials in each run), and included 64 
trials for each condition (16 in each run; EA Congruent, EA Incongruent, IA Congruent, IA 
Incongruent). To validate the participants’ familiarity with all the objects used in the task, prior 
to task administration, participants were presented with all the objects and their names, and were 
asked to draw a line between each object and its name (Figure 6.3). The participants were then 
asked to point to all the objects that share a certain property, following the same questions used 
in the task. A short practice trial using a different set of objects and questions was administered 
before each version of the task to ensure the participant’s understanding of the task and increase 
Figure 6.2. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict version. 
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familiarity with the required responses (i.e., Yes/No responses using the right or left click on the 
computer mouse).   
 
 
 
 
 
Data Analysis 
Task performance analysis. The data were analyzed using mixed model ANOVA tests, 
with Group (ASD vs. TDC) as the between-subject factor, and Attention (Internal vs. External), 
Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent) and Conflict (With Conflict vs. Without Conflict) as 
within-subject factors. RT, Accuracy and Efficiency were measured and entered into the model 
as the dependent variables. Efficiency, calculated as Accuracy/RT, is the probability of accurate 
Figure 6.3. Internal-External Attention Task – practice trial. 
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response per unit of time in seconds. Thus, higher efficiency scores (> 1.0) represent better 
performance in terms of both accuracy (higher percent accuracy) and RT (shorter RT). For RT, 
outliers (defined as values that exceed two standard deviations above and below the mean) were 
calculated for each participant within each of the 4 conditions and removed from the data set. All 
accuracy scores were >75%. 
Correlational analysis with clinical symptoms and traits. Exploratory non-parametric 
correlation analyses (Kendall’s tau-b) were conducted between efficiency scores on the EA and 
IA conditions in the No-Conflict version of the task (i.e., combined scores across congruency), as 
well as Conflict Effect efficiency scores (i.e., Congruent minus Incongruent) in the EA and IA 
conditions, and scores on the SRS, AQ, and EQ, as well as ADOS Social and Communication 
scores and the Total ADOS scores for the ASD group. 
All data analyses were conducted using SPSS version 25.0 (IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Windows, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). Graphic representations of the data were performed using 
GraphPad Prism version 7.00 (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA).  
Results 
 Internal and external attention without conflict. Between-group differences were 
tested using a mixed-model 3-way ANOVA, with Attention and Congruency as within-subject 
variables and Group as a between-subject variable. In terms of RT, results indicated a significant 
main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 149.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .84), where participants across groups 
had longer RTs in the IA condition (M = 1173.84, SEM = 56.80) compared to the EA condition 
(M = 1021.57, SEM = 49.07) (Figure 6.4). In addition, a significant main effect of Congruency 
was found (F(1,29) = 15.09, p = .001, ηp2 = .34), where participants across groups had longer 
RTs in the Incongruent condition (M = 1113.79, SEM = 50.94) compared to the Congruent 
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condition (M = 1081.62, SEM = 54.74) (Figure 6.5). Finally, a marginal Group by Congruency 
interaction was found (F(1,29) = 3.92, p = .057, ηp2 = .12), where the difference between the 
congruent (M = 996.17, SEM = 78.65) and incongruent (M = 1044.73, SEM = 73.19) conditions 
in the TDC group was larger than the difference between the congruent (M = 1167.06, SEM = 
76.15) and incongruent (M = 1182.84, SEM = 70.87) conditions in the ASD group, indicating a 
larger congruency effect in the TDC group compared to the ASD group (Figure 6.5). No main 
effect of Group (F(1,29) = 2.15, p =.15), or a Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = .08, p = 
.78) were found.    
 In terms of accuracy, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
21.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .42), where participants across groups had better accuracy in the EA 
condition (M = 96.858, SEM = .636) compared to the IA condition (M = 94.651, SEM = .875) 
(Figure 6.4). No main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 2.62, p = .12) or Congruency (F(1,29) = 1.7, p 
= .20), and no Group by Congruency interaction (F(1,29) = .156, p = .70) or a Group by 
Attention interaction (F(1,25) = .48, p = .49) were found. 
 In terms of efficiency, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
162.893, p < .001, ηp2 = .85), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the IA 
condition (M = .87, SEM = .04) compared to the EA condition (M = 1.019, SEM = .048) (Figure 
6.4). A significant main effect of Congruency was also found (F(1,29) = 19.67, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.40), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the Incongruent condition (M = 
.920, SEM = .04) compared to the Congruent condition (M = .969, SEM = .05) (Figure 6.5). In 
addition, a significant Group by Congruency interaction was found (F(1,29) = 4.71, p = .038, ηp2 
= .14), where the difference in efficiency between the congruent (M = 1.063, SEM = .071) and 
incongruent (M = .991, SEM = .060) conditions in the TDC group was larger than the difference 
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between the congruent (M = .874, SEM = .068) and incongruent (M = .849, SEM = .058) 
conditions in the ASD group (Figure 6.5). Finally, there was a trend for a main effect of Group 
that did not reach significance (F(1,29) = 3.33, p = .078, ηp2 = .10), where participants in the 
ASD group had overall lower efficiency (M = .862, SEM = .063) compared to the TDC group (M 
= 1.027, SEM = .065), across task conditions (Figure 6.6). A trend of Group by Attention by 
Congruency interaction was also found (F(1,29) = 3.49, p = .072), where differences in 
efficiency between the congruent and incongruent conditions were slightly elevated in the IA 
condition relative to the EA condition in the ASD group, but slightly elevated in the EA 
condition relative to the IA condition in the TDC group. No Group by Attention interaction 
(F(1,29) = 1.86, p = .182) was found. 
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Figure 6.4. Internal-External Attention Task – No-Conflict version. There was a main effect of Attention 
in efficiency (p < .001), RT (p < .001), and Accuracy (p < .001), but no Group by Attention interaction. 
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Figure 6.5. Internal-External Attention Task – No-Conflict version. There was a main 
effect of Congruency in efficiency (p < .001) and RT (p < .001), as well as a Group by 
Congruency interaction in efficiency (p < .05). 
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Figure 6.6. Internal-External Attention Task – No-Conflict version; a trend for main effect of Group in 
efficiency (p = .078), but not in RT (p =.15) or Accuracy (p = .12). 
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Internal and external attention with conflict. A mixed-model 3-way ANOVA was 
utilized, with Attention and Congruency as within-subject variables and Group as a between-
subject variable. In terms of RT, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) 
= 65.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .70), where participants across groups had longer RTs in the IA 
condition (M = 1090.2, SEM = 54.65) compared to the EA condition (M = 929.24, SEM = 43.29) 
(Figure 6.7). In addition, a significant main effect of Congruency was found (F(1,29) = 41.98, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .59), where participants across groups had longer RTs in the Incongruent condition 
(M = 1032.82, SEM = 47.99) compared to the Congruent condition (M = 986.62, SEM = 48.86) 
(Figure 6.8). A significant Attention by Congruency interaction was also found (F(1,29) = 13.24, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .31), where the difference in RT between the Congruent (M = 1056.91, SEM = 
55.14) and Incongruent (M = 1123.49, SEM = 54.48) conditions was larger for IA, compared to 
EA (Congruent M = 916.33, SEM = 43.81; Incongruent M = 942.16, SEM = 43.31), indicating a 
stronger congruency effect in the IA condition compared to the EA condition, across groups 
(Figure 6.8). Finally, a marginal main effect of Group was found (F(1,29) = 3.68, p = .065, ηp2 = 
.11), where on average, the ASD group had longer RTs compared to the TDC group, across task 
conditions (Figure 6.9). No Group by Attention (F(1,29) = 1.91, p =.18), or a Group by 
Congruency (F(1,29) = 2.50, p = .13) interactions were found.    
In terms of accuracy, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
23.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .45), where participants across groups had better accuracy in the EA 
condition (M = 97.29, SEM = .48) compared to the IA condition (M = 94.52, SEM = .84) (Figure 
6.7). A significant main effect of Congruency was also found (F(1,29) = 7.17, p = .012, ηp2 = 
.20), where participants across groups had better accuracy in the Congruent (M = 96.61, SEM = 
.57) compared to the Incongruent (M = 95.20, SEM = .77) condition (Figure 6.8). Finally, there 
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was a significant Attention by Congruency interaction (F(1,29) = 5.03, p = .033, ηp2 = .15), 
where the difference in accuracy between the Congruent (M = 95.73, SEM = .69) and 
Incongruent (M = 93.31, SEM = 1.14) conditions was larger for IA, compared to EA (Congruent 
M = 97.50, SEM = .56; Incongruent M = 97.09, SEM = .51), indicating a more prominent 
congruency effect in the IA condition compared to the EA condition, across groups. No main 
effect of Group (F(1,29) = 1.31, p = .26), a Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = 1.95, p = 
.17) or a Group by Congruency interaction (F(1,29) = 1.69, p = .21) were found. 
In terms of efficiency, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
183.205, p < .001, ηp2 = .86), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the IA 
condition (M = .953, SEM = .051) compared to the EA condition (M = 1.124, SEM = .051) 
(Figure 6.7). In addition, a significant main effect of Congruency was found (F(1,29) = 28.52, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .50), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the Incongruent 
condition (M = 1.00, SEM = .046) compared to the Congruent condition (M = 1.076, SEM = 
.056) (Figure 6.8). A significant main effect of Group was also found (F(1,29) = 6.23, p = .018, 
ηp2 = .18), where participants in the ASD group had overall lower efficiency (M = .912, SEM = 
.070) compared to the TDC group (M = 1.164, SEM = .073), across task conditions (Figure 6.9). 
Finally, a marginal Group by Congruency interaction was identified (F(1,29) = 4.00, p = .055, 
ηp2 = .12), where the difference in efficiency between the congruent (M = 1.217, SEM = .080) 
and incongruent (M = 1.112, SEM = .066) conditions in the TDC group was larger than the 
difference between the congruent (M = .935, SEM = .078) and incongruent (M = .888, SEM = 
.064) conditions in the ASD group (Figure 6.8). No Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = 
1.47, p = .236), or Group by Attention by Congruency interaction (F(1,29) = .003, p = .957) were 
found.   
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Figure 6.7. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict version. There was a main effect of Attention 
in efficiency (p < .001), RT (p < .001), and accuracy (p < .001), but no Group by Attention interaction. 
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Figure 6.8. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict version. There was a main effect of 
Congruency in efficiency (p < .001), RT (p < .001), and accuracy (p < .05), as well as a Group by 
Congruency interaction in efficiency (marginal; p = .055) and RT (p < .001). 
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Figure 6.9. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict version; a main 
effect of Group in efficiency (p < .05) and RT (marginal; p = .065). 
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Internal and external attention with and without conflict. To test the effects of 
conflicting Internal/External information on task performance, scores in each of the Attention 
conditions were averaged across Congruency conditions. A mixed-model 3-way ANOVA was 
utilized, with Attention and Conflict as within-subject factors, and Group as a between-subject 
factor. In terms of RT, the results demonstrated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
123.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .81), where participants across groups had longer RTs in the IA condition 
overall (M = 1132.01, SEM = 54.72) compared to the EA condition (M = 975.49, SEM = 44.91) 
(Figure 6.10). In addition, a significant main effect of Conflict was found (F(1,29) = 19.49, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .40), where contrary to our predictions, participants across groups had shorter RTs in 
the Conflict condition (M = 1009.77, SEM = 48.30) compared to the No-Conflict condition (M = 
1097.78, SEM = 52.71) (Figure 6.11). No significant main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 2.94, p = 
.097), a Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = 1.21, p = .28), or a Group by Conflict 
interaction (F(1,29) = .60, p = .44) were found. 
 In terms of accuracy, the results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) 
= 35.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .55), where participants across groups had better accuracy in the EA 
condition overall (M = 97.08, SEM = .50) compared to the IA condition (M = 94.60, SEM = .80) 
(Figure 6.10). No significant main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 2.18, p = .15) or Conflict (F(1,29) 
= .16, p = .74), and no Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = 1.81, p = .19), or Group by 
Conflict interaction (F(1,29) = 1.10, p = .30) were identified.   
In terms of efficiency, results indicated a significant main effect of Attention (F(1,29) = 
311.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .92), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the IA 
condition (M = .912, SEM = .046) compared to the EA condition (M = 1.072, SEM = .049) 
(Figure 6.10). A significant main effect of Conflict was also found (F(1,29) = 22.25, p < .001, 
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ηp2 = .43), where participants across groups had lower efficiency in the No-Conflict condition (M 
= .945, SEM = .046) compared to the Conflict condition (M = 1.039, SEM = .051) (Figure 6.11). 
In addition, there was a significant main effect of Group (F(1,29) = 4.88, p = .035, ηp2 = .14), 
where participants in the ASD group had overall lower efficiency (M = .888, SEM = .066) 
compared to the TDC group (M = 1.096, SEM = .068), across task conditions (Figure 6.12). 
Finally, a significant Group by Conflict interaction was found (F(1,29) = 4.65, p = .040, ηp2 = 
.14), where the difference in efficiency between the Conflict (M = 1.164, SEM = .073) and No-
Conflict (M = 1.028, SEM = .073) conditions in the TDC group was larger than the difference 
between the Conflict (M = .913, SEM = .070) and No-Conflict (M = .863, SEM = .063) 
conditions in the ASD group (Figure 6.10). A trend for a Group by Attention by Conflict 
interaction (F(1,29) = 3.81, p = .061), but no Group by Attention interaction (F(1,29) = .03, p = 
.877), were found.    
  
 
 
78  
  
Figure 6.10. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict vs. No-Conflict versions. There 
was a main effect of Attention in efficiency (p < .001), RT (p < .001), and accuracy (p < 
.001), but no Group by Attention interaction. 
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Figure 6.11. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict vs. No-Conflict versions. There 
was a main effect of Conflict in efficiency (p < .001) and RT (p < .001), as well as a Group 
by Conflict interaction in efficiency (p < .05). 
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Figure 6.12. Internal-External Attention Task – Conflict Vs. No-Conflict 
versions; a main effect of Group in efficiency (p < .05). 
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Correlations with clinical symptoms and traits. Significant correlations were identified 
between EA Conflict Effect scores and scores on the AQ (Tb = -.29, p = .024), and EQ (Tb = .32, 
p = .014), such that greater Conflict Effect was associated with lower AQ scores and higher EQ 
scores. In addition, IA Conflict Effect scores were negatively correlated with the ADOS Total 
scores (Tb = -.45, p = .018). Finally, both EA and IA efficiency scores were negatively correlated 
with ADOS Imagery subscale (EA: Tb = -.56, p = .022; IA: Tb = -.59, p = .015). 
Discussion 
 This study utilized a novel task, designed to directly measure internal and external 
attention with and without conflicting internal/external information. In accordance with our 
hypothesis, we predicted that participants in the ASD group would have more difficulty (i.e., 
decreased efficiency, increased RT, and reduced accuracy) in the IA condition relative to TDC, 
and that performance would decrease with conflict. For both versions of the task (i.e., No-
Conflict and Conflict), results indicated worse performance in the IA condition across measures 
(efficiency, RT and accuracy), compared to the EA condition across groups, suggesting that IA is 
overall more cognitively demanding than EA. An overall lower efficiency in the ASD group 
relative to TDC was also found in both versions of the task across task conditions, suggesting a 
general deficiency in cognitive efficiency in ASD, relative to TDC. These findings are consistent 
with previous studies demonstrating reduced efficiency of information processing in ASD 
(Mackie & Fan, 2016). Of note, no main effect of group was found in terms of RT or accuracy 
across tasks and conditions, suggesting that efficiency is a more sensitive measure, taking into 
account both RT and accuracy. In addition, as expected, performance was overall worse in the 
incongruent, compared to the congruent trials across groups and in both versions of the task 
across all three dependent variables. This predicted congruency effect supports the validity of the 
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task. Importantly, however, the Congruency by Group interaction identified in both versions of 
the task (in efficiency and RT, but not in accuracy), indicated that ASD participants were less 
sensitive to the congruency effect, with negligible differences in efficiency and RT between the 
congruent and incongruent trials, relative to TDC. This suggests that the presence of the non-
target (i.e., distractor) stimuli had little influence on the ASD participants’ responses to the target 
stimuli, whether they were congruent or incongruent with the targets. Results from the 
correlation analyses further demonstrate that reduced sensitivity to the conflict effect is 
associated with increase in ASD symptoms (i.e., ADOS Total) and traits (i.e., AQ and EQ). 
These findings are consistent with the central coherence account of ASD which emphasizes a 
centrally-biased, detailed-focused cognitive style in ASD, that fails to take contextual 
information into account (Burnette et al., 2005; Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 2006). In 
accordance with this view, it is possible that ASD participants focused solely on the target 
stimulus from the moment the question appeared on the screen and the target stimulus was 
identified, disregarding any previous knowledge they have acquired regarding the non-target 
stimulus. In the TDC group, on the other hand, information acquired during the exposure to the 
non-target stimulus at the beginning of each trial influenced their responses to the target stimulus 
by enhancing performance when this information was congruent, and decreasing performance 
when it was incongruent. This difference between the groups supports our hypothesis of reduced 
utilization of past knowledge and experience in interpreting current situations in ASD, and is 
consistent with Bayesian accounts of ASD as well (Lawson et al., 2014; Palmer, Lawson, & 
Hohwy, 2017; Pellicano & Burr, 2012) (see Chapter VI: General Discussion for a detailed 
discussion).  
 A comparison between the Conflict and No-Conflict versions of the task revealed faster 
 
 
83  
RTs and greater efficiency in the Conflict version in both groups. One possible explanation for 
this unexpected finding is that it reflects a practice effect; all the participants followed the same 
order of task administration, where the Conflict version followed the No-Conflict version, thus, 
performance improved with practice despite the presence of conflicting information. 
Interestingly, a significant Group by Conflict interaction was found as well, where the ASD 
group showed almost no difference in efficiency between the Conflict and No-Conflict 
conditions, while in the TDC group, efficiency was significantly higher in the Conflict, relative 
to the No-Conflict conditions. This significant Group by Conflict interaction may further 
demonstrate a decreased influence of previous experience in the ASD group, as they were far 
less affected by the practice effect. 
Another explanation for this finding may be that the cognitive processes that are required 
for internal and external representations of the information are greatly different, such that the 
presentation of both in one trail actually eliminated the conflict, making this version of the task 
easier (i.e., there was no interference by the non-target object in this version). However, the 
significant main effect of Congruency that was found in the Conflict version of the task suggests 
that the presentation of the non-target objects influenced response to the target objects, making 
this account less plausible.     
Finally, contrary to our hypothesis and predictions, no Group by Attention interaction 
was found in any of the analyses. These results do not support an external attention-bias in ASD, 
suggesting that the group differences identified by this study may not be attributed to limited 
internal attention, and may be accounted for by other cognitive/neurobehavioral mechanisms. As 
discussed above, a detailed-oriented cognitive style with a local over global bias, as suggested by 
the Central Coherence hypothesis (Burnette et al., 2005; Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 
 
 
84  
2006), can explain the similar performance on congruent and incongruent trials in the ASD 
group. In accordance with this model, it is possible that participants with ASD merely focused on 
the target, and were not influenced by contextual information (i.e., the distractor). Thus, their 
performance was not influenced by the congruency (or incongruency) of the distractors. Another 
cognitive mechanism that may explain the current findings is a deficit in the predictive coding 
process, either due to attenuation of priors (Pellicano & Burr, 2012), heightened sensory 
precision (Lawson et al., 2014), and/or decreased prediction precision (Gomot & Wicker, 2012). 
Abnormality in the predictive coding process would lead to reduced influence of prior 
knowledge and beliefs on perception. Thus, the attenuated influence of congruency on 
performance in the ASD group may also be explained by deficiency in predictive coding; while 
the participants were exposed to the incongruent information for 3 seconds prior to the 
identification of the target in each trail, it did not affect performance in the ASD group, 
suggesting limited ability to incorporate experience and knowledge in the guidance of behavior. 
That the current findings did not support our attention-bias model, is not a direct indicator 
that such a bias does not exist in ASD. Rather, it may stem from the weak ecological validity of 
the task. While the task used in this study was designed to effectively manipulate internal and 
external orientation of attention under controlled conditions, it is far from representing the 
complex interplay between internal and external attention in real world situations. This is 
particularly relevant to social interactions, where rapid interpretations, predictions, and conflict 
resolution  are required, which would depend on prior experience and knowledge (Baird et al., 
2011; Bar, 2009; Gerlach et al., 2011). Thus, it may be that while the ability to attend internally 
may not be deficient in ASD, reduced cognitive flexibility in ASD may limit the capacity for 
rapid shifting between internal and external orientation of attention, affecting behavior during 
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real-world interactions. Thus, reduced flexibility may result in external attention bias when 
interacting with the external world, even if the ability to attend internally without competition is 
preserved. Indeed, reduced cognitive flexibility is documented in ASD (Sanders, Johnson, 
Garavan, Gill, & Gallagher, 2008; Van Eylen et al., 2011), particularly in clinical context 
(Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009; Leung & Zakzanis, 2014), and may provide another account 
for reduced incorporation of internal information in behavior and perception of affected 
individuals.  
 Taken together, results from the current study indicate an overall reduced processing 
efficiency in ASD, as well as decreased sensitivity to incongruent information, but did not 
support deficiency that is specific to internal attention. A reduced practice effect in ASD may 
also be reflected by the results. Thus, these findings suggest that while individuals with ASD are 
capable to attend internally, they may have difficulty in incorporating internally-represented 
information to facilitate interpretation of external information, which may also reduce their 
capacity for experience-based learning.     
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Chapter VII 
General Discussion 
 The series of studies presented in this work aimed at investigating internal and external 
attention under different task constraints in high functioning adults with ASD. The hypothesis 
tested by this work is that ASD is related to attentional bias, where increased allocation of 
attention to the external environment limits the available attentional resources that may be 
directed internally. This limits accessibility to internal information, such as memories and 
knowledge, resulting in reduced ability to incorporate knowledge and experience into the 
formation of predictions and interpretations of the external world. This attention bias creates a 
vicious cycle, as in the absence of adaptive predictions and interpretations, the external 
environment is perceived as unpredictable and ambiguous, increasing anxiety. In the attempt to 
reduce ambiguity (and hence, anxiety), external attention is increased, further limiting internal 
attention. While the findings from this work support reduced utilization of internal knowledge in 
guiding behavior (i.e., task performance) in ASD, our hypothesis that the deficit is attentional in 
nature was not supported by the data. 
 Internal attention in ASD. This work examined internal and external orientation of 
attention in a state of rest (no task constraints), under minimal external demands, and under 
internal and external task demands with and without conflicting internal and external 
information. Overall, participants with ASD demonstrated typical internal attention, and did not 
differ from TDC in their tendency to attend internally during rest, in frequency of mind 
wandering during a simple task, or in internal vs. external distraction. When required to shift 
between internal and external orientation of attention, participants with ASD performed overall 
poorly, relative to TDC (see discussion below), but this was not more prominent in the IA 
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relative to the EA condition, as would have been predicted by our hypothesis. While no study to 
date directly measured internal attention in ASD, evidence from several studies in the ASD 
literature suggest impairment in this domain. For instance, autobiographical (Tanweer et al., 
2010) and episodic memory (Lind & Bowler, 2010), as well as episodic future thinking (Lind & 
Bowler, 2010), were found to be limited and less-detailed in ASD, compared to TDC. Evidence 
for restricted self-referential processing in ASD was also found and linked to ASD 
symptomatology (Lind, 2010; Lombardo et al., 2007; Uddin, 2011). These differences, however, 
may be attributed to a less elaborated concept of ‘self’ in ASD (Lind, 2010; Lombardo et al., 
2007; Uddin, 2011), rather than to an internal attention deficit. Similarly, although an 
experience-sampling study in three high-functioning adults with ASD has demonstrated limited 
spontaneous mentation in these individuals (Hurlburt et al., 1994), it is possible that the core 
deficit captured by the study was in their ability to report their experiences, rather than in their 
ability to attend internally.  
 Evidence for an altered, more ‘realistic’ perception in ASD suggest reduced incorporation 
of knowledge and experience in perception and interpretation of the external environment. For 
instance, it was demonstrated that individuals with ASD are less prone to visual illusions (Bölte 
et al., 2007; Happe, 1996), better at copying impossible figures (Mottron et al., 1999), less 
influenced by perspective cues during a visual perception task (Ropar & Mitchell, 2002), and 
their performance on an object recognition task did not improve with the presence of cast 
shadow cues (Becchio et al., 2010). Together, these findings suggest a decreased influence by 
prior knowledge in ASD. While a general deficit in internal attention may account for these 
findings, other explanations were proposed as well. The Central Coherence theory (Frith & 
Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 2006), for example, suggests that ASD is characterized by a detail-
 
 
88  
oriented perception, with a local-over-global bias, and a decreased ability to integrate 
information in context. The perceptual abnormalities described above, therefore, may be 
explained by excessive attention to details that fails to take the contextual surroundings into 
account (Frith, 1997). According to Bayesian accounts of ASD, abnormality in the predictive 
coding process, which may be related to attenuation of priors (Pellicano & Burr, 2012), 
heightened sensory precision (Lawson et al., 2014), and/or decreased prediction precision 
(Gomot & Wicker, 2012), results in reduced influence of prior knowledge and beliefs, and 
decreased internal constraints on perception (Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012).  
Our model of attention-bias is closely related to the Predictive Coding account of ASD, 
both emphasizing a general inability to interpret the external environment in the context of past 
knowledge and experience. Whereas the Bayesian theories of ASD argue for an imbalance in 
precision (i.e., increased sensory precision and decreased prior precision), we argued for an 
imbalance in attention (i.e., increased external/sensory attention and decreased internal 
attention). The findings of the present work did not support any specific deficit in internal 
attention in our ASD sample across task conditions; however, the reduced congruency effect 
(and possibly, practice effect) in ASD found in Study 3 suggest reduced influence of acquired 
information on task performance. Thus, while the results of the current studies did not provide 
evidence of internal attention deficit in ASD, they support reduced incorporation of past 
knowledge and experience in current perception and behavior, which may be related to atypical 
cognitive processing other than attention, e.g., predictive coding.   
External Attention in ASD. Contrary to our hypothesis of increased external attention in 
ASD and our predictions of increased self-reported external attention and better performance on 
external task conditions relative to TDC, no significant differences were found in self-reported 
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attention orientation or frequency of mind-wandering, and between-group differences in task 
performance were not specific to the external attention conditions. Thus, although sensory 
sensitivities in ASD are well-documented (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Liss et al., 2006; Pellicano, 
2013; Robertson & Baron-Cohen, 2017) and are now included in the diagnostic criteria as a core 
feature of the disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), there is no evidence in the 
current work to suggest that the sensory symptoms of ASD are related to enhanced external 
attention. Instead, they may be explained in the context of predictive coding. According to the 
Bayesian models of ASD, a bias towards sensory precision in this disorder favors sensory 
evidence and limits confidence in existing knowledge and beliefs (Friston et al., 2008). 
Moreover, attenuated priors may increase reliance on sensory information, thereby enhancing 
sensory perception (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Further, the postulated precision bias impairs the 
ability to form adaptive predictions and interpretations of sensory inputs based on knowledge 
and experience, thereby limiting internal constraints on perception (Gomot & Wicker, 2012; 
Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). As discussed above, our data support decreased 
influence of prior knowledge and experience in ASD, thus, supporting the Bayesian framework; 
however, there is no statistical evidence from our findings to suggest that this deficit is related to 
increased external attention.     
A deficit in predictive coding and diminished adaptation in ASD was also found in the 
interoceptive context (Gu et al., 2015), suggesting a general deficit in utilizing internal 
knowledge to predict and interpret sensory (external) signals – in this case, interoceptive signals 
from within the body. In this recent study from our group, we looked at autonomic and brain 
activities during a performance of a task measuring empathy for pain (Gu et al., 2015). We found 
that while ASD participants demonstrated poor discriminability for other’s pain relative to TDC, 
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their autonomic responses (i.e., SCR) were enhanced, as was their pain-related activity in the 
Anterior Insular Cortex, a cortical hub for interoceptive processing. These intriguing results 
suggested that while ASD participants had an enhanced interoceptive response for other’s pain, 
this sensory information was not adaptively interpreted and/or utilized to improve pain 
discriminability (Gu et al., 2015). Furthermore, it is possible that the observed enhancement in 
the interoceptive sensory signal and cortical processing is a direct consequence of the postulated 
deficiency in predictive coding processes; namely, an enhanced interoceptive (sensory) precision 
and reduced prior precision (Gu et al., 2015; Lawson et al., 2014).    
 Reduced cognitive processing efficiency in ASD. Our data revealed an overall reduced 
efficiency of cognitive processing in the ASD group, compared to the TDC group, across the 
different tasks and task-conditions. These findings are in agreement with a previous study from 
our group, demonstrating a lower efficiency of both sequential and non-sequential information 
processing, as well as reduced cognitive control in ASD under different levels of uncertainty 
(Mackie & Fan, 2016). Together, these findings suggest a more general cognitive deficit in 
information processing, rather than a specific abnormality in internal and/or external attention. 
However, as results showing reduced efficiency in our ASD sample were found during 
performance of both a very simple task (i.e., our simplified version of the X-CPT), and more 
challenging tasks (i.e., internal-external attention tasks, with and without conflict), our data does 
not support the Complex Information Processing account of ASD (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; 
Minshew et al., 1997), which argues for abnormal information processing capacity in ASD that 
is specific to complex integration of information, but should not manifest during tasks with low 
cognitive demands. Strikingly, cognitive processing efficiency in our ASD group did not differ 
significantly between congruent and incongruent conditions, nor was it affected by the presence 
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of conflicting information. Thus, our findings provide support for the Central Coherence theory 
of ASD (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 2006), suggesting a locally-biased attention and 
an impaired ability for contextual integration. Our data also supports the Predictive Coding 
account of ASD (Lawson et al., 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Sinha et al., 2014), suggesting a 
reduced influence of acquired knowledge on current behavior.       
 Study limitations. Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the results 
of this work. First and foremost, the findings of the current studies are compromised by the small 
sample-size, which limits statistical power and reliability of results. Small samples are especially 
problematic in ASD research due to the great variability in symptoms and presentations between 
affected individuals (Eilam-Stock et al., 2016). Additionally, although restricting the sample to 
high-functioning adults with ASD can limit the variability within the sample and increase 
statistical power, it creates a nonrepresentative sample and has significant implications on the 
ability to draw conclusion on the entire ASD population.    
A second limitation of our study is the validity of our tasks as reliable measurements of 
internal attention. Internal attention is a complex construct, and its definition in the literature is 
not unified. Here, we defined it as attention to information originating within the brain. However, 
due to its internal nature, designing tasks that will directly measure internal attention is 
challenging. In study 1, internal attention was measured by self-reports, which are entirely 
subjective and may be prone to a between-subject variability in the ability to accurately define 
attention orientation when probed to do so. This ability would rely on a certain degree of self-
awareness, which may be limited in ASD (Hobson et al., 2006; Lombardo et al., 2007; Lombardo 
et al., 2010; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). In Study 2, internal attention was measured by more 
objective measures of task performance, presumably indexing mind-wandering, as well as 
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subjective self-reports of mind-wandering and internal vs. external distractibility. Task 
performance, however, may be related to factors other than mind-wandering, such as an overall 
deficit in cognitive efficiency, as our data in fact suggested. Our internal-external attention task 
employed in Study 3 was specifically designed to manipulate and measure internal and external 
attention, by asking about a visual property of an object presented in either pictures (i.e., external 
attention condition) or names (i.e., internal attention condition). While answering a question 
regarding a visual property of an object that is presented only by name requires internal 
representations of that object (e.g., by accessing semantic knowledge or mental imagery), the 
familiarity of the objects and the repetitive nature of the task requires a very brief internal 
orientation of attention, which possibly does not allow for capturing existing differences in 
prolonged internal mentation. Furthermore, the internal attention condition in our task was not 
completely decoupled from external attention; the participants needed to attend externally during 
stimulus presentation, and then rapidly shift their attention internally in order to make their 
judgements. It is well documented that cognitive flexibility and psychomotor speed are 
compromised in ASD (Goldstein, Johnson, & Minshew, 2001) (Sanders et al., 2008; Van Eylen 
et al., 2011), particularly in clinical contexts (Geurts et al., 2009; Leung & Zakzanis, 2014), as is 
their ability to rapidly and accurately shift their attention between two different stimuli (Allen & 
Courchesne, 2001). It is possible, therefore, that the rapid attention-shifting requirements of this 
task interfered with our ability to detect an existing difference in internal vs. external attention 
between the groups. On the other hand, it may be that the attentional shifting between external 
and internal sources of information required by this task was, in fact, less demanding compared 
to real-world demands, suggesting poor ecological validity. Indeed, real-world interaction, 
particularly in the social realm, are characterized by complex and rapid interplay between 
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internally and externally directed attention, to allow incorporation of prior knowledge and 
experience in guiding one’s behavior  (Baird et al., 2011; Bar, 2009; Gerlach et al., 2011). Thus, 
reduced flexibility may result in external attention bias when interacting with the external world, 
even if the ability to attend internally under less demanding, well-controlled conditions is 
preserved.  
 Conclusions. The series of studies delineated in this work aimed at examining internal-
external attention bias as a possible contributor to the clinical features of ASD. The hypothesis 
tested by the current work is that ASD is related to excessive external attention and reduced 
internal attention, which limit the ability of affected individuals to incorporate internal 
information when formulating hypotheses, predictions and interpretations of the world. While 
our data suggest a deficit in incorporation of internal knowledge to guide behavior, as our model 
predicted, no statistical evidence was found to support a specific deficiency in the ability to 
attend internally in any of the tasks. Thus, our findings did not support an external over internal  
attention-bias in ASD in a state of rest, during a simple task with low cognitive demands, as well 
as during a more challenging task that requires shifting orientation of attention between internal 
and external stimuli under different levels of conflict and incongruency. Our findings, therefore, 
support models that emphasize deficits in contextual integration and predictive coding in ASD, 
but do not support the hypothesis that these deficits stem from a more fundamental deficiency in 
internal attention. Several factors, including limited validity of the tasks, within-group 
variability, and a small-sample size may account for the insignificant results.    
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Appendix A 
 
  
Thought-probe practice sheet 
During the experiment, a thought probe will randomly appear on the screen at different times, asking 
you: 
Where was your attention focused just now, before the probe appeared?  
1. Something in the external environment  
2. Bodily sensation  
3. Thought, memory, or concern  
4. I don’t know / Nothing in particular 
 
To make sure that it’s all clear, please classify the following statements of possible internal contents by 
writing down the choice number next to each statement. 
a. I was feeling hungry _____ 
b. I was thinking about what I’m going to eat for lunch _____ 
c. I was trying to remember if I turned off the stove before leaving the house this morning ____ 
d. I was listening to a conversation going on in the other room _____ 
e. I was thinking what a boring experiment it is _____ 
f. I was feeling tired _____ 
g. I was thinking about a class/work project I need to submit ____ 
h. I was looking at the wall _____ 
i. I tried to remember what was the name of my new professor _____ 
j. I was planning my schedule for the semester _____ 
k. I was looking at a dirty spot I have on my shirt _____ 
l. I was feeling thirsty _____ 
m. I was thinking about the best way to drive home tonight ____ 
n. I was trying to make a mental list of things I need to buy in the supermarket ____ 
o. I was concentrating on the noise coming out of the computer ____ 
p. I was thinking about a conversation I had with my mother last week ____ 
q. I was making plans for the weekend _____ 
r. I was completely blank, have no idea where my mind was ____ 
s. I was thinking about something I need to discuss with my partner ____ 
t. I was planning where to go on my next vacation _____  
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Appendix B 
SCR Meta-calculation Channel 
Below is a detailed description of the different calculations that are performed by the individual 
subchannels to allow for a real-time detection of SCR.  
  C1.0 produces a value of one on the very first sample point of the file and is zero forever 
after. 
  C1.1 is C1.0 times the raw data provided by the GSR100C. Therefore, it is the value of 
the first sampled GSR value at the first point and is again zero forever after. 
  C1.2 looks for peaks in C1.1 and holds the maximum value of the most recent peak.  
There is only one peak in C1.1. -  the first data point. Therefore, C1.2 has the value of the first 
sample point from the GSR100C for all data points. 
  C1.3 is the raw GSR data minus C1.2. Therefore, it is the raw GSR data minus the raw 
data's initial value. 
C1.4 sets the first three points to -0.1.  After that it is C1.3 (raw GSR minus initial value). 
C1.5 is the phasic skin conductance.  It is C1.4 run through a 0.05 Hz high pass filter.   
  C1.6 is a mean value smoothing of C1.5.   
C1.7 is a thresholding operation on C1.6.  Whenever the smoothed phasic skin 
conductance rises from below 0.02 µS to above 0.02 µS, this channel has a value of one.  It stays 
at one until the phasic skin conductance changes from a value above zero to a value below zero. 
Then, it stays zero until the phasic skin conductance rises above 0.02 µS again. 
C1.8 is a control calculation channel. It passes the results of C1.7 to digital channel zero.  
This put digital channel zero into the high state whenever C1.7 is between 0.5 and 2.  C1.7 is 
always either zero or one, so C1.8 will have a value of one whenever C1.7 does, and it will drop 
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back to zero whenever C1.7 does. 
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